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Abstract 
 
Across the United States and Europe, notice and consent, the 
act of clicking that “I have read and agree” to a platform’s terms 
of service, is the central device for legitimating and enabling 
platforms’ data processing, acting as a free pass for a variety of 
intrusive activities which include profiling and behavioral 
advertising.  Notwithstanding literature and findings that lay 
significant doubts on notice and consent’s adequacy as a 
regulatory device in the platform ecosystem, courts, regulators 
and other public authorities across these regions keep adopting 
and legitimating these practices.  Yet while consent seems a good 
proxy for ensuring justice in the platform economy, it is an empty 
construct.  This Article explains how notice and consent practices 
in the platform economy are not only normatively futile but also 
positively harmful.  Narrow understandings that focus on 
voluntariness and disclosure such as the ones generally adopted 
by regulators and courts fail to account for the systemically 
unjust background conditions within which voluntary 
individual acts of consent take place.  Through such narrow 
approaches, regulators are failing to acknowledge that consent 
cannot be reasonably taken to morally transform the rights, 
obligations and relationships that it purports to reshape.  
Further, it positively harms consumers in at least three ways: 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
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burdening them with decisions they cannot meaningfully make; 
subordinating their core inalienable rights to respect and dignity 
to the economic interests of platforms and creating widespread 
ideological resistance against alternatives.  Notice and consent 
as a discourse is hardly contestable and is currently part of the 
rigid background of assumed facts about our digital 
environment.  As new legislation is devised in the US and new 
opportunities to reinterpret the GDPR present themselves in the 
EU, we must be more courageous in looking beyond the façade of 
individual control and instead grapple with the core structure of 
corporate surveillance markets.  The longer we fail to 
acknowledge consent’s irrelevance to data governance, the longer 
we will deny ourselves respect and protection from the ever-
growing expansion of digital markets into our lives. 
 
Introduction 
 
When attempting to create an account on Facebook.com, 
individuals are prompted to read a set of Terms of Service,1 
which they can choose to scroll through and ignore, and are 
simultaneously asked to tick a box, usually situated at the 
bottom of the screen, to indicate their agreement to such terms.  
These contractual terms, alongside multiple annexed clauses 
and webpages,2 form the basis of a user’s contractual agreement 
with Facebook, an agreement which, amongst other things, 
broadly regulates the types of data that Facebook can collect 
 
* S.J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School. I thank Professors Yochai 
Benkler, Richard Fallon, Urs Gasser, Meira Levinson, Mathias Risse, Thomas 
Scanlon, and Lucas Stanczyk for their valuable input on this piece. I also thank 
the Edmond J. Safra Center’s Graduate Fellows of 2018-19 and the Berkman 
Klein Center’s fellows, affiliates and staff for conversations and inspiration on 
this topic. 
 1. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/update?ref=old_policy (last visited Nov. 
24, 2019). 
2. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019); About Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/about (last visited Nov. 24, 2019); Your Ad 
Preferences, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/preferences/?entry_product=education_page 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
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from its users and the possible uses it can make of such data.  
Facebook collects data provided by individuals at the moment of 
opting-in and throughout their relationship with the company, 
for a variety of uses and purposes including but not limited to 
the targeting of advertising, content moderation, and the 
improvement of platform functionality.3  Facebook has also 
recently been found to combine data from its users’ Facebook 
profiles with other data collected on them through other 
Facebook and non-Facebook services such as Instagram and 
others.4 
The increasing risks attached to intrusive data harvesting 
practices, including the targeting of content and ads based on a 
person’s personal features, prompt us to ask anew why the law, 
along with other factors, enables and incentivizes data-driven 
activities by placing unjustified regulative power in notice and 
consent mechanisms?  The law could directly shape and 
constrain dataflows and hold companies accountable by 
determining the kinds of information that should and should not 
be generated, collected, and used.  Instead, around the globe the 
emphasis on what Daniel Solove has called “privacy self-
management,”5 reliance of contractual privacy policies, shifts the 
regulatory burden on users, leaving the industry free to engage 
in harvesting activities as they wish.  Within the existing 
ecosystem, notice and consent’s main function seems to be to 
performatively legitimate otherwise unregulated unacceptable 
corporate practices, and to facilitate permissionless innovation. 
It is striking to note how recurrent the emphasis on 
individual consent and disclosure requirements is in privacy 
legislation and company practices around the world.  In the 
United States, privacy self-management is the primary check on 
 
3. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
4. Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative Business Terms Pursuant to 
Section 19(1) GWB for Inadequate Data Processing, BUNDERSKARTELLAMT (Feb. 
15, 2019), https://perma.cc/95X5-83DW; Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook 
from Combining User Data from Different Sources, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Feb. 
7, 2019), https://perma.cc/3PFM-7MVP; Background Information of the 
Facebook Proceeding, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/RB4P-S9Y8. 
5. See Symposium, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013). 
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companies’ ability to engage in data-driven activities as they 
wish, albeit being a voluntary and self-regulated practice.6  The 
European Union has a more substantive approach to consent 
based on informational self-determination.7  Under the recent 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),8 the burden of 
proving valid consent is greater, as consent must be informed, 
specific, unambiguous, freely given,9 and consent is not the only 
basis for lawful processing.10  Yet even the European approach 
places too much emphasis on informed consent, thus failing to 
protect users in the platform economy. 
While much past and recent academic work has emphasized 
the limits of notice and consent,11 few are those who present a 
 
6. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). Note that the FTC 
has a role in bringing civil actions against entities that engage in unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce under 15 U.S.C.S. § 45 
(LEXIS  through Pub. L. 116-72). 
7. See, e.g., Symposium, Privacy and Technology: The EU-U.S. Privacy 
Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 
(2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment 
and the Limits of Data Protection (May 2019) (draft presented at the Privacy 
Law Scholars Conf.); Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William 
McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy (May 2019) (draft presented at the Privacy 
Law Scholars Conf.). 
8. Gen. Data Protection Reg. 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016. 
9. Id. at arts. 4, 6, and 7. (E.g. Article 7 of the GDPR on “conditions for 
consent” reads as follows: “(1) Where processing is based on consent, the 
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to 
processing of his or her personal data. (2) If the data subject’s consent is given 
in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the 
request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly 
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible 
form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which 
constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. (3) The data 
subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The 
withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on 
consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be 
informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. (4) When 
assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of 
whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a 
service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not 
necessary for the performance of that contract.”). 
10. There are six bases for lawful processing of data under the General 
Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016. One of these bases is 
that ‘the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal 
data for one or more specific purposes’ under Article VI(1)(a). 
11. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Computing Ethics: Big 
5
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nuanced account of consent that attempts to guide concrete 
policy.12  Much of the existing work on digital consent falls into 
one of two clusters.  It either usefully articulates consent’s 
normative force but then mirrors the industry’s consent-friendly 
stance, or otherwise it engages in abstract or indiscriminate 
rejections of the practice without sufficient articulation of how 
consent operates and what is at stake.  Yet, as Elizabeth 
Edenberg and Meg Leta-Jones have shown, the legitimacy of 
consent is not a binary question and must be evaluated 
contextually.13  Consent has an important normative function: 
the potential to transform an act of trespass into a legitimate 
invitation, or an act of battery into legitimate contact.  We must 
scrutinize both the normative role and the discursive force of 
digital consent to explain when and why regulators must depart 
from the centrality of this practice in certain contexts. 
When it comes to the digital economy, as early as 2014 
Helen Nissenbaum and Solon Barocas argued that “[c]onsent . . . 
should not bear, and should never have borne, the entire burden 
of protecting privacy.”14  This Article goes a step further.  It 
argues that the ideal of autonomous consent cannot be reached 
in practice in the platform economy because the conditions 
which constitute consent as a morally transformative device are 
absent.  These conditions are three-fold: (1) that which is being 
transformed through consent must be capable of being 
transformed; (2) that acts of consent must not significantly harm 
third parties; and (3) that objectionable power imbalances must 
not be shaping the environment within which a decision to 
 
Data’s End Run Around Procedural Privacy Protections, 57 COMMC’N OF THE 
ACM 31, 33 (Nov. 2014), https://perma.cc/X8FF-8C27; Solon Barocas & Helen 
Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INT’L FORUM ON THE APP. AND MGMT. 
OF PERS. ELEC. INFO. (2009); Fred H. Cate & Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Notice 
and Consent in a World of Big Data, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY LAW 67 (2013); Julie 
E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. (2019); 
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 133 (2017); 
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, supra note 5; SHOSHANA 
ZUBOFF, infra note 213. 
12. See, e.g., Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy 
Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL. 
(2019). 
13. Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Leta-Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and 
Moral Core of Digital Consent, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1 (2019) 
14. Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 33. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
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consent is made.  In other words, consent is structurally 
incapable of empowering individuals in the platform economy.  
What remains is an empty construct.  This is not an argument 
about the validity of individual instances of digital consent, but 
rather about the justifiability of relying on notice and consent as 
a default practice. 
The discourse15 of autonomous consent and the assumptions 
that underlie it positively harm consumers in two ways: by 
imputing responsibility on users for outcomes that no one could 
have reasonably chosen; and by focusing attention on the wrong 
kinds of values and creating collective resistance around 
alternatives that should be promoted.  It seems that notice and 
consent in fact act as technologies of power:16 a default practice 
that has become hard to contest and is part of the background of 
assumed facts about our digital environment.  When faced with 
the effects of such a default practice, entrepreneurs and 
regulators too often recite arguments about the absolute 
primacy of individual autonomy.  Individuals need greater 
control over their digital lives, they say, and consent is the best, 
if not the only, option we have.  These responses are symptomatic 
of a dismaying lack of imagination around existing and future 
alternatives. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I of this Article 
articulates the subjective and objective dimensions of consent, 
its morally transformative function, and shows that for consent 
to operate as a morally transformative device it must be given 
under just background conditions.  This requires three things: 
(1) that what is being transformed through consent must be 
capable of being transformed; (2) that acts of consent must not 
significantly harm third parties; and (3) that there must be no 
objectionable power imbalances. 
Part II of this Article looks at how notice and consent are 
interpreted and relied on in the United States and Europe, 
 
15. On the notion of discourse, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., Random House 
1978) (1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Tavistock Publications 
Limited 1971) (1969). 
16. The term is borrowed from Foucault. See Michel Foucault, About the 
Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth, 21 POL. 
THEORY 198 (1993). 
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showing that even the most stringent of approaches to data 
privacy seem to rely on interpretations of consent’s role that fail 
to protect consumers. 
Part III of this Article explores what individuals have 
reason to demand (in the platform economy), their digital 
“interests,” and compares those interests to what the reality of 
notice and consent enables them to demand from platforms.  It 
shows that reliance on notice and consent structurally 
presupposes that we subject our fundamental interests to 
platforms’ own selfish interests. 
Part IV of this Article develops these insights by showing 
that privacy and protection from digital harms, such as 
manipulation and discrimination, have aspects that cannot be 
disposed of through consent: they have an inalienable core and 
interpersonal aspects that must be managed collectively.  
Further, it shows that subjecting any residual alienable aspects 
to the operation of notice and consent can lead to systemic harm 
in the platform economy. 
Part V of this Article concludes by re-evaluating notice and 
consent’s normative salience, asking whether paternalism can 
be an argument for resisting alternatives and develops an 
understanding of platform power that helps explain the existing 
gap between what we have reason to want in the platform 
economy, and what relying on notice and consent prevents us 
from obtaining under the mirage of autonomy, transformative 
power and coveted free services. 
 
I. What Consent Is For 
 
Consent is a contested concept that serves important social, 
political and normative functions in our society.  In moral 
philosophy, an act of consent between two people is a reason to 
normatively reassess their relationship.  Consent has a 
transformative normative function, it changes the justifications 
individuals have toward one another, the moral rights and 
obligations that exist between them.  By consenting to someone 
entering into my house, I allow them to be inside it, 
transforming a trespass into a legitimate visit.  By consenting to 
a doctor’s auscultation, I transform a battery into an act of 
legitimate contact.  Consent is key to the moral transformation 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
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of these and many other human relationships, and it would be 
difficult to imagine a world in which consent had absolutely no 
legitimating function or value.  Yet when it comes to the digital 
economy, such value becomes at least questionable. 
To evaluate whether digital consent has the moral force it is 
said to possess, we should look not only at whether the consenter 
acted autonomously of his own will, but also at the background 
conditions that constitute consent as a morally transformative 
device.  This section articulates these two key aspects of moral 
consent, emphasizing that background conditions and 
underlying power dynamics constitute the moral transformative 
force of consent. 
 
A. Elements of Consent 
 
1. Three Scenarios 
 
The following three fictional scenarios might guide our 
intuitions about the core case of moral consent. 
Imagine a society, not so different from many existing ones, 
call it society A, where being born a girl means you will undergo 
a female genital mutilation procedure.  Is being born a girl a 
form of consent to these procedures?  No one in society A asks 
the baby whether it wants to undergo the procedure.  Being born 
a woman does seem to legitimate a variety of degrading or 
discriminatory treatments, yet saying that these treatments 
have been normatively legitimated through consent seems 
absurd.  An inborn characteristic such as sex at birth can hardly 
be a form of consent. 
Imagine now a second society, society B, where a person 
must give a stone to another person to indicate that they accept 
physical contact.  In society B, women cannot legitimately be 
touched unless they transfer a stone to the persons they accept 
to be touched by.  It seems that the passing of a stone serves as 
a form of consent: it is a self-directed act and is capable of 
changing the rights and obligations between stone givers and 
stone receivers. 
Imagine finally a society C where if a woman wears a red 
dress, people can approach and talk to her, and if she does not 
wear a red dress, then they cannot.  In such a society whether or 
9
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not a woman can be spoken to is partly determined by herself 
and her decision to wear red, and partly subject to arbitrary 
cultural constraints about when wearing red is appropriate.  
Depending on context, women might intentionally choose to 
wear red or be forced to wear red.  One might envisage different 
varieties of society C: somewhere red dresses are very rare, 
others where women must wear red on most social occasions.  
Where wearing a red dress is fully voluntary, an argument 
might be made – likely controversially - that it is a form of 
consent. 
These fictional examples provide us with three insights.  
First, they help us see a spectrum that ranges from intentional 
acts of the consenter self-directedly imposing normative 
consequences on themselves, to social norms or practices that 
persons are subjected to or forced to follow by virtue of their 
existence in a society (birth, social pressure, other external 
factors).  Second, the examples point to an intuition, that the 
more an act is intentional and self-directed, the more it can be 
said to fall within the moral core of consent.  Third, it seems that 
consent is a performative act whose normative meaning is highly 
dependent on the social, political and cultural conditions that 
enable it: things that amount to consent in one society or group 
may not amount to consent in other contexts. 
The question, then, is what distinguishes a core case of 
morally transformative consent from things that are not 
understood as consent and what characteristics indicate 
whether a given cultural ritual, action or attitude amounts to 
consent.  In other words: is there a test that allows us to 
recognize morally significant consent?17 
 
2. Accounts of Consent 
 
This subsection outlines possible accounts of consent with 
the aim of exploring the nature and contours of morally 
significant consent rather than defending any specific account.  
Consent between persons is said to have a “transformative role 
 
17. Note: the work of H.L.A. Hart on the normative “core” and “periphery” 
of a rule of law and the rule of “recognition” for law is impliedly in this passage. 
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1961). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
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in interpersonal interactions.”18  It transforms the rights and 
obligations that exist between persons, rendering impermissible 
things permissible and changing the expectations between 
consenter and consentee.  Two core cases of consent between 
individuals can be identified:19 
 
[C]onsent can sometimes function like a 
proprietary gate that one opens to allow another’s 
access, access that would be impermissible absent 
the act of voluntarily opening the gate. [. . .] Or, 
sometimes, consent can function like a normative 
rope whereby one binds oneself to another.20 
 
In spite of significant overlap between these two cases, 
digital consent mainly falls within the former case: it operates 
as a gate that allows access to personal data.  Consenting to an 
online privacy policy effectively authorizes a tech company to 
perform actions vis-à-vis users that prior to their consent would 
not have been justifiable.  Having obtained user consent, the 
company can now engage freely in otherwise illegitimate data 
collection and uses such as profiling or microtargeting. 
But what exactly is consent and how to explain its 
transformative moral power?  Joseph Raz offers a helpful 
analytical understanding of how consent works: 
 
Consent is given by any behaviour (act or 
omission) undertaken in the belief that (1) it will 
change the normative situation of another; (2) it 
will do so because it is undertaken with such a 
belief; (3) it will be understood by its observers to 
be of this character.21 
 
Raz understands consent as being mainly about how the 
consenter perceives their act.  Yet we can see it as having two 
 
18. Edenberg & Leta-Jones, supra note 12. See also John Kleinig, The 
Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(Franklin Miller & Alan Werthmeier, eds., 2009). 
19. Kleinig, supra note 18, at 4.  
20. Id. 
21. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 81 (1986). 
11
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components.  First, it has a subjective dimension: the consenter’s 
intention or mental acceptance that their act of consent (or 
omission) will change the rights and obligations of another, and 
that the act will be perceived by others as consent.  Unless there 
is a self-directed act of the will on the consenter’s part, there can 
be no consent.  Second, consent has an objective dimension: it 
must be perceived by external observers as changing the rights 
and obligations between consentee and consenter.  Both 
subjective and objective elements are reflexive: the subjective 
act of the will cannot acquire moral salience without belief in 
external recognition, and external recognition must go to the 
subjective element too.  Accounts of consent are divided on the 
question of which of these two elements should have more 
salience.  While some believe consent is mostly about the mental 
state of the consenter, and exists insofar as a subjective act of 
the will was present, others believe the notion of consent is 
contextual and must be understood as a communicative act: 
unless external observers perceive the act as being one of 
consent there can be no consent at all.22 
Moreover, according to some philosophers the core function 
of consent is in its authorizing function.23  Consent allows us to 
authorize others to perform certain actions vis-à-vis us.  This 
particular function of consent as an authorization mechanism is 
particularly problematic in the digital economy.  Consent 
operates as an authorizing mechanism for corporate actions, 
shielding the actors from otherwise legitimate complaints.  
While consent can operate as an enabling device for companies, 
the flipside is that it deprives users of some of their complaints 
against platforms. 
 
B. Conditions and Transformation 
 
1. Conditions for Consent 
 
At its best, an exercise of moral consent allows the consenter 
to shape and change the course of their life and is an expression 
 
22. Kleinig, supra note 18, at 4.  
23. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL 
OBLIGATIONS 76 (1979).  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
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of individual autonomy.24  At its worst, consent is a mere 
fictional performance with no effects on existing power 
structures and individual expectations.  There is a vast 
literature on the conditions of moral consent, the various “tests” 
we might need in order to distinguish autonomous acts of 
consent from things that are not properly acts of consent. 
Richard Fallon provides a helpful taxonomy on what he calls 
the “conditions of [descriptive] autonomy.”25  If indeed we 
understand the best cases of consent as constituted by a self-
directed act, consent must at least fulfill the following conditions 
for autonomous choice: (i) a critical and self-critical ability, (ii) 
competence or capacity to act and choose, (iii) a sufficient 
number of alternatives to choose from, and (iv) absence of 
coercion or objectionable manipulation.26  Raz also specifies that 
there must be an adequate range of morally acceptable options 
meaning that the options must be varied in kind: it is more 
autonomous to choose among a few good options than among 
many very bad ones.27  For him, choosing among bad options may 
not be autonomous at all. 
Elizabeth Edenberg and Meg Leta Jones provide a list of 
core conditions that are specific to digital settings.28  The first 
condition they isolate is that (i) there must be a common and 
clear understanding of the “background conditions for justifiable 
and unjustifiable terms for collecting, using, and sharing 
personal data,” which for them means broad societal agreement 
on baseline and ceiling levels of permissible data use.29  The 
other four conditions they identify all operate within the 
parameters set by the first: (ii) a clearly defined scope for digital 
consent; (iii) sufficient information and a sufficient 
understanding of such information on the part of the consenter; 
 
24. Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF 
CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (2009). 
25. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 
875, 886 (1994). 
26.  Id.  See also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
AUTONOMY (1988) (distinguishing between two aspects of autonomy 
understood as self-rule: independence of one’s deliberation and choice from 
manipulation by others and capacity to rule oneself). 
27. RAZ, supra note 21, at 372. 
28. Edenberg & Leta-Jones, supra note 12. 
29. Edenberg &Leta-Jones, supra note 12, at 1811. 
13
320 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1 
 
(iv) a viable set of options that the consenter can voluntarily 
choose from; and (v) fair treatment of each of the parties to the 
consensual relationship.30 
Taking stock of various existing formulations of the 
conditions of moral consent, including some that are included in 
current laws, one could tentatively define moral consent as 
possessing the following overlapping characteristics: 
 
a) The person consenting must have the rational capacity 
to meaningfully consent, i.e. they must not be too young, 
mentally or physically impaired.  They must have what 
Fallon calls critical and self-critical ability,31 i.e. a 
capacity to rationally foresee the effects of one’s actions, 
evaluate them and assess alternatives. 
b) The act of consenting must not be subject to coercion or 
objectionable manipulation of the will. 
c)   The act of consenting must be voluntary in the sense 
that there must be at least one viable and morally 
acceptable alternative in the form of a viable option to 
walk away.  An ambitious version of this condition would 
include both an ability to withdraw consent and the 
power to shape the content of the agreement 
transforming it into a better alternative agreement. 
d) The scope of the consent must be limited fairly. 
e) Consent must be fully informed, it must be preceded by 
a reasonable disclosure of the context, as well as the 
possible and probable effects of consenting. 
f)    Consent must be present consent: a person should be free 
to confirm or withdraw their consent at any moment in 
their relationship with the other party. If the conditions 
change, these must be disclosed.  If consent is only 
expressed once at the start of a relationship, changes in 
circumstances may weaken its moral force and arguably 
also its legal validity. 
g) Consent must be given under otherwise just background 
conditions: which includes the pre-condition of a full and 
transparent disclosure of options available and their 
 
30. Id. 
31. Fallon, supra note 25, at 886.  
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content and implications, the fact that having the choice 
must not consistently and unfairly lead to 
discriminatory or unjust results for certain classes of 
people, possibly a basic structure complying with 
Rawlsian justice requirement.32 
 
2. Identifying Morally Transformative Consent 
 
In analyzing these lists of criteria, the goal has been to 
distinguish acts or omissions that an external observer would 
see as consent from acts or omissions that would not be 
understood as consent.  However, an ambiguity underlies these 
lists of conditions.  Some of these criteria help us distinguish acts 
of consent from things that are not consent, while other criteria 
help us determine whether an existing act of consent has a 
morally transformative role.  Bill might have consented to John 
eating his snack in school, but if he did so because he has been 
repeatedly bullied in the past then we can see how his consent, 
no matter how autonomous and freely given, can hardly be 
understood to justify John’s act transforming it into a legitimate 
food sharing arrangement.  Consent cannot change the injustice 
of John’s act given the history of John’s relationship with Bill.  
As Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer have emphasized, the 
key question is not really whether consent exists or is valid, but 
whether an act of consent can be taken to justify a legitimate 
transformation of rights, obligations and expectations.33 
The key question for us, therefore, is which conditions 
constitute consent as a morally transformative act?  Subjective 
conditions of autonomous self-directed consent tell us whether 
an act can properly be classified as consent in accordance with 
Raz’ definition, but offers poor guidance when it comes to 
determining whether consent legitimizes given consequences.  
The fact that an act is self-directed and performed in the belief 
that such act is an act of consent and will be perceived as such 
is insufficient to legitimizing transformative consequences.  
Legitimacy is contextual and depends on background conditions 
 
32. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Otfried Hoffe eds., 2d ed. 1999). 
33. Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent 
Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (Miller & Wertheimer ed., 2010). 
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(Edenberg and Leta Jones’ first condition, or our condition (g)), 
which include questions of power and influence exercised over 
users even when they don’t know it. 
An important question in the platform economy is whether 
ensuring just background conditions is possible. 
 
C.  Three Aspects of Morally Transformative Consent 
 
What are just background conditions in the platform 
economy, and when can ideal consent perform its transformative 
role?  Morally transformative consent cannot be identified by 
drawing up a list of representative background conditions of 
justice, or a “test” for recognizing morally transformative 
consent.  It is a question that must be assessed by looking at how 
power materializes in any given context in which consent is 
relied on.  Three characteristics of consent are nonetheless worth 
isolating to make sense of consent’s transformative role. 
 
1. Consent and Alienability 
 
Taking consent to be transformative of states of affairs, 
rights, and obligations between persons presupposes that these 
states, rights, and obligations are of a kind which can be 
transformed through consent.  Letting someone enter into one’s 
house transforms a trespass into a license to stay in the house 
and also changes the position of the consentee from trespasser 
into guest.  The right to prevent strangers from entering into 
one’s house appears to be modified when one invites a stranger 
inside, so that one now has less reason to object to their being 
inside.  Similarly, it seems that our right to prevent others from 
using certain information about us, such as our date of birth, is 
of a kind which can be amended by consent.  After providing our 
date of birth to another, we have less reason to object to their 
use of that information.  However, there are certain kinds of 
rights or entitlements of persons which cannot be transformed 
through consent.  In a famous French case, it was found that 
dwarfs could not consent to being thrown by a nightclub’s clients 
in exchange for money because the personal dignity and respect 
owed to persons with physical disability could not be given away 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
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for money.34  Similarly, it could be argued that certain 
particularly intrusive data practices, such as behavioral 
targeting for political purposes, should not be capable of being 
consented to, that our right to be immune from undue political 
influences is inalienable. 
 
2. Consent and the Collectivity 
 
Moral consent operates between a consentee and a 
consenter, generally to amend the consenter’s relationship with 
the consentee.  Consent may affect third parties who are 
unaware or have no means of influencing the act of consent.  If 
an act of consent has far-reaching consequences for third parties, 
it is argued that letting the consenter and consentee regulate 
such consequences can be inappropriate.  In other words, the 
core case for morally transformative consent is a case where the 
only persons affected by an act of consent are the consenter and 
the consentee(s).  As we shall see, digital notice and consent is 
the opposite kind of case, one where the consent of one person 
has the potential to affect larger groups of people. 
 
3. Power 
 
Third, considering the moral significance of consent 
amounts to investigating the kinds of power dynamics that 
underlie an act of consent and determining when the act, even if 
autonomous, no longer gives rise to justifiable consequences. In 
some cases indeed an act could be self-directed yet be affected by 
factors that delegitimate its effects.  Questions that might reveal 
underlying power dimensions of this kind include: Was the act 
voluntary and made under just background conditions?  What 
reasons did the consenter have to consent and what reasons did 
they have not to consent?  Were there imbalances in the degree 
of influence that the parties to the consent relationship exercised 
over the formation of consent?  What other structural, 
contextual, or environmental factors might generate doubt on 
 
34. Conseil d’Etat [CE] [French Administrative Court] Ass., Oct. 17, 1995, 
136727, Rec. Lebon. CE Ass., Oct. 27, 1995, 136727, Rec. Lebon 372.   
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the consenter’s decision to consent?35 
To sum-up, it seems that although morally transformative 
consent can hardly be defined through lists of conditions, it is 
constituted by three factors: (a) what is being transformed 
through consent must be capable of being transformed and not 
inalienable; (b) acts of consent must not significantly harm third 
parties; and (c) consent must be autonomous in a wide sense, i.e. 
it must not be the result of nudging, manipulation, false beliefs 
or knowledge gaps.  In other words, consent has no value if it is 
shaped by systemic and invisible exercises of power. 
 
D.  Morally Transformative vs. Idealized Consent 
 
Sometimes consent is arguably absent, for example where 
Bill is told that if he does not give his snack to John someone will 
beat him.  Other times consent exists but does not have 
transformative moral force, i.e. it does not provide reasons for 
accepting transformative consequences.  This is where Bill is so 
used to being repeatedly bullied that he consents to giving his 
snack to John or another innocent schoolboy Alex, having had 
the freedom not to do so.  In a third set of circumstances, consent 
exists and has morally transformative force.  This is where for 
instance Bill and John are friends and willingly consent to 
sharing snacks with one another. 
If an act of consent possesses all of the subjective features 
of consent outlined above, but lacks the constitutive conditions 
that give it morally transformative force, for instance by 
operating under unacceptable background conditions, then we 
can say that consent does not have morally transformative force.  
In many instances, consent that falls short of being 
transformative is nonetheless treated as if it were 
transformative.  In those cases, we call the appearance of 
morally significant consent idealized consent. 
Treating the bullying case as a valid case of consent is 
idealizing Bill’s consent.  When ticking a box indicating that we 
“have read and understood the terms” we seem to consent to the 
terms.  But ticking a box resembles the bullying scenario more 
than it resembles the third scenario in which Bill and John are 
 
35. See STEPHEN LUKES, POWER A RADICAL VIEW (2005), ch. 1. 
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friends and choose to share their snacks in an act of reciprocal 
friendship.  There are several reasons why this might be so.  
Users hardly have access to viable alternatives to existing terms, 
and if they do have alternatives, these are often shaped by the 
platform itself and are alternatives within a platform service 
rather than a fair choice amongst competing platforms.  There 
are additional concerns relating to lack of visibility, knowledge 
asymmetries, and the manipulability of users.  We might even 
want to go as far as saying that digital notice and consent 
schemes have been designed to get individuals to decline 
authority over certain matters.  We might want to say, then, that 
many cases of online consent are cases of idealized consent. 
 
E. Conclusions to Part I 
 
To sum up, saying that an act of consent gives us reason to 
normatively reassess the relationship between two or more 
parties entails assuming that at least three things are true.  
First, it entails assuming that any states of affairs, rights, and 
obligations purportedly being transformed through consent are 
of a kind which can be so transformed.  Second, it entails 
assuming that any effects of consent on persons that are not 
parties to the consent relationship are not significantly harmful.  
Third, it entails assuming that consent can be largely free and 
autonomous and that the background context for consent is not 
structurally unjust or skewed in favor of some parties in the 
consent relationship.  As this article will show, these three 
propositions are hardly all true in the platform economy. 
As we will see in Part II of this Article, the core issue with 
practices of notice and consent in the United States and Europe 
is not necessarily that they exist, but rather that they are 
premised on the assumption that digital consent can be morally 
transformative in the platform economy as long as the conditions 
of disclosure can be strengthened.  Instead, what the lawyers 
and regulators constructing the meaning of legal consent 
routinely miss is that in the digital economy legal consent 
operates in the absence of all of the three essential elements that 
give consent its transformative moral force.  In other words, 
notice and consent is an instance of idealized consent. 
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** 
II. The Construction of US and EU Notice and Consent 
Practices 
 
This section provides an overview of key aspects of the 
regulation of consumer privacy through notice and consent on 
two sides of the Atlantic: the Federal Trade Commission’s 
limited powers to oversee the industry’s “notice and choice” 
practices in the United States, and European national data 
protection authorities’ powers under the General Data 
Protection Regulation.  It shows that in both systems, 
enforcement efforts that promote the centrality of information 
disclosure and of subjective criteria of informed consent are 
based on unreasonable assumptions about these devices’ morally 
transformative force.  By failing to scrutinize the background 
conditions within which notice and consent frameworks come 
into play, courts, agencies and regulators who construct the 
meaning of legal consent in the platform economy are 
legitimizing a practice that appears to have no legitimizing 
moral force.  While in the US legal reform that counters 
voluntary notice and choice industry practices is needed, the EU 
case shows that the deeper issue is not just legal reform, but 
rather the need for a change in perception and in regulatory 
attitudes toward data intensive industry practices. 
 
A. “Notice and Choice” in the United States 
 
1. Brief History of Voluntary “Notice and Choice” 
 
With the advent of the Internet in the 1990s, the question 
of how to protect privacy in a massively replicable and connected 
environment became a concern.  It quickly became apparent that 
pre-Internet legislation would not protect individuals against 
new digital privacy interferences.36  Back in the 1970s, the Fair 
 
36. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), (holding that DoubleClick’s cookies did not violate the 
Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) by intercepting a group of 
plaintiffs’ communications because the websites had “consented” to 
DoubleClick’s access). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
2019 CONSENT AS A FREE PASS 327 
 
Information Practices Principles (FIPPs)37 had established the 
privacy self-management paradigm in the United States by 
introducing three core ideas: notice, consent, and purpose 
limitation.38  Under the FIPPs individuals had to be notified 
about the data collected about them and about the uses made of 
such data, and had to consent to such practices.  Such principles 
however never made it into a comprehensive U.S. privacy law, 
and were instead incorporated in a piecemeal fashion in various 
sectoral legislative instruments, the most salient example 
possibly being the 1974 Privacy Act which only applies to 
Federal Agencies.39 
Notwithstanding the United States’ sectoral approach, the 
voluntary practice of “notice and choice” progressively 
established itself as the digital privacy management default for 
US consumers. Self-certification emerged in the late 1990s 
through organizations such as TRUSTe which issued “seals” to 
companies that had privacy policies that complied with certain 
standards,40 and by 2001, almost all websites had privacy 
notices.41  Yet the fact that privacy policies were voluntary 
rather than legally mandatory served industry players who 
could develop new products without undergoing any regulatory 
scrutiny as long as individuals kept opting in. 
As a matter of contract law, the enforceability of digital 
privacy policies is debated.  These policies have been repeatedly 
held unenforceable either because they were not considered to 
be binding under contract law, or for failure to show the harm 
suffered.42  In Dyer, for example, the District Court for North 
 
37. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Records, Report of the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, 
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens 41-42 (1973). 
38. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Info. Pracs. and the Architecture of Privacy 
(What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001). See also 
Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New 
Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, MAR. L. REV. 
(2019) (draft presented at PLSC 2019, p. 12). 
39. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 552a). 
40. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 593. 
41. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control 
over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 594 (2007). 
42. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 595–97. See, e.g., In re JetBlue 
Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Dyer v. Northwest 
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Dakota held that an airline’s privacy policy was a broad 
statement of company policy and did not constitute a contract.43  
Scrolling through a web page or clicking on the “download” 
button for a new software product has been held insufficient to 
constitute assent to the underlying terms and conditions.44  Such 
browsewrap agreements have been enforced in cases where the 
relevant link or pop-up was repeatedly brought to a consumer’s 
attention and the consumer was held to have had an opportunity 
to walk away, and therefore, have assented.45  Clickwrap 
contracts, which require the positive ticking of a box 
unambiguously indicating that one has read and understands 
the terms and conditions, have instead generally been 
enforced,46 though the case law on this point is surprisingly 
limited.  Users have, therefore, not been able to rely on contract 
law to challenge companies’ privacy policies.  Tort law has also 
mostly been unhelpful for addressing the limits of privacy policy-
based governance on the Internet, particularly because 
expansive interpretations of privacy torts are generally held to 
clash with First Amendment protections.47 
Generating accountability around these policies has, 
therefore, required the involvement of a different kind of 
enforcement apparatus.  The United States Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) started to consider consumer privacy 
 
Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d (D.N.D. 2004); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy 
Litig., 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. 2004); Daniels v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton 
Hotel Co., No. 2:06-CV-0333-ECR-LRL, 2006 WL 1796008 (D. Nev. 2006). See 
also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. TENTATIVE DRAFT, 2019) 
(seeking to establish new rules for browserwrap contracts.). 
43. Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
44. See Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Nguyen v. Barnes 
& Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer 
Data Security Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012); see also 
Aaron Hall, Are Clickwrap or Browsewrap Contracts Enforceable?, AARON 
HALL ATTORNEY (November 1, 2018),  https://perma.cc/6H9P-XDMQ. 
45. See, e.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E. 2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 
2005). See also ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the analogous case of shrinkwrap contracts, which are included 
within the sealed package of a new product, and which have been enforced 
when there was an opportunity to walk away). 
46. See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
47. See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Reinvigorating a Common Law 
Approach for Data Breaches, YALE L. J. F. (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Information 
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185 (2016). 
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violations in 1995,48 through its powers under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act to police “unfair or deceptive” trade practices.49  As 
Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have stated, the plan was 
that”[t]he FTC would serve as a backstop to the self-regulatory 
regime, providing it with oversight and enforcement – essentially 
with enough teeth to give it legitimacy and ensure that people 
would view privacy policies as meaningful and trustworthy.”50  In 
other words, the FTC’s enforcement would provide legitimacy to 
an otherwise unchecked self-governing practice. 
The FTC is a civil law enforcement agency that operates by 
bringing lawsuits or settling matters directly with the 
companies who have committed violations, and does not have 
statutory powers to enforce its own agenda.  It starts at ten 
privacy-related actions per year on average based on its powers 
to prevent deceptive and unfair commercial practices.51  The 
number seems low considering these are the most effective 
means of policing commercial privacy violations in the US, the 
number of violations likely to occur every year and the general 
unavailability of remedies under private law or statute.  
Furthermore, the procedure before the FTC normally ends in a 
settlement or consent order and not in a decision that can be 
appealed.  This further limits consumers’ ability to litigate 
privacy violations. 
The practice of “notice and choice” leaves us with two 
questions: (1) Is FTC enforcement bold enough to deter 
unwelcome privacy intrusions, or does it remain a performative 
façade?; and (2) If voluntary “notice and choice” practices are 
insufficient to address consumer harms, what kind of legislation 
is needed? 
 
2. The FTC’s Enforcement Action against “Deceptive” and 
“Unfair” Trade Practices 
 
In 1998 the FTC began its enforcement against “deceptive” 
 
48. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 598. 
49. 15 U.S.C.S. § 45 (LEXIS through Public Law 116-72). 
50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 598-9 (emphasis added). 
51. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 600; see also Federal Trade 
Commission, Privacy & Data Security: Update 2018 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/2UGB-KZ23 . 
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practices, with a weak enforcement apparatus and a limited 
scope of action.52  Its theory of deception developed to cover not 
only promises that had been breached, but also deceptive 
inducements by companies to disclose customer data and cases 
of insufficient notice and disclosure in relation to privacy-
invasive activities.  Deception is made of three elements: (a) a 
representation, omission, or practice likely to mislead the 
consumer; (b) it was reasonable for someone within the target 
consumer group to be misled; and (c) the representation, 
omission, or practice was “material” in the sense that it was 
likely to affect a consumer’s choice regarding products or 
services.53  The deception doctrine entrenches the assumption 
that information can solve consumer privacy issues: the key 
element is the disclosure or its absence, and the main question 
is whether the disclosure was sufficient and accurate.  If a 
practice has been properly disclosed and consumers have 
accepted its related risks, there is no reason for the FTC to use 
its deception powers. 
Yet the FTC also has “unfairness” powers.  Dennis Hirsch 
has argued that contrary to the FTC’s deceptiveness doctrine, 
the unfairness doctrine can address most algorithmic privacy 
harms.54  As it currently stands, however, the doctrine has a 
quite limited scope.  A practice will be deemed unfair if it “causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”55  In practice, this three-part test, and in particular 
the fact that the injury must be reasonably unavoidable, heavily 
constrains the FTC’s scope of action.  If a consumer had options 
to choose a different competitor or product, or if the injury was 
otherwise avoidable through a proper exercise of judgment, then 
the FTC has no power to intervene. 
Data practices, however, can be very harmful to consumers 
 
52. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6. 
53. See U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception 
(1983), https://perma.cc/826X-X9YN.  
54. Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New 
Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, MD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (West, West Law through P.L. 116-72). 
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even when they are disclosed, consented to, and hypothetically 
avoidable.  As highlighted by behavioral economists: people 
frequently do not choose the best for themselves.  They rarely 
read privacy policies before opting in, and when they do, they 
fail to understand them.56  There are various psychological 
factors at play when choosing to opt in,57 e.g. incompatible 
preferences or ethical stances, contradictory needs, internal 
biases, or biases in the choice architecture.58  Information that 
is complete can be presented in ways that manipulate 
individuals to opt in. 
It has been argued that the FTC’s unfairness doctrine 
already covers latent manipulation.59  It encompasses 
behavioral considerations and is evolving toward encompassing 
predictive analytics and behavioral advertising practices.  
Practices that have been considered unfair by the FTC include 
retroactive policy changes,60 deceitful data collection,61 improper 
uses of data,62 unfair default settings,63 and unfair information 
security practices.64  It remains to be seen how innovatively the 
FTC will interpret its powers in future.  Still, a regulatory 
apparatus premised on the supremacy of consumer choice and 
on the importance of informational disclosures arguably cannot 
go far enough in the digital economy.  The FTC’s powers under 
 
56. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
57. Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimante & George Lowenstein, 
Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 
(2015). 
58. See Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy, 7 IEEE SECURITY & 
PRIVACY 82 (2009); See also Susan Athey, Christian Catalini & Catherine 
Tucker, The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small Talk 
1-26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23488, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/9UNW-K9SL; SUNSTEIN & THALER, infra note 201; Erik 
Brynjolfsson, Felix Eggers & Avinash Gannamaneni, Using Massive Online 
Choice Experiments to Measure Changes in Well-being 1-74 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24514, 2018), https://perma.cc/T8Z8-
NU7N. 
59. Hirsch, supra note 54.  
60. See, e.g., In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004); In re 
Facebook Inc., 2012 WL 3518628 (2012) [hereinafter Facebook Complaint]. 
61. See, e.g., In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., 155 F.T.C. 483 (2013). 
62. Id. 
63. See, e.g., In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 2007 WL 1942983 (2007). 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., FTC File No. 
072-3228 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2009). 
25
332 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1 
 
section 5 are based on the assumption that consumers must bear 
the ultimate burden of privacy governance in the digital 
economy.  Yet individuals are not always the most appropriate 
locus of governance in a platform context, particularly if choice 
is likely to be distorted by power asymmetries and unjust 
background conditions. 
 
3. Facebook and Beyond 
 
The FTC’s current unfairness doctrine is the result of an 
evolutionary process, yet one that hardly seems sufficient to 
fully protect consumer privacy in the United States because it 
remains centered on individual choice and information 
disclosures.  A salient example of the FTC’s enforcement powers 
in action will serve to illustrate this argument. 
In In re Facebook, Inc., the FTC found that Facebook had 
not properly notified its users of changes to its privacy settings, 
and that some of these changes constituted deceptive and unfair 
practices.65  The new policy was considered deceptive because it 
inaccurately informed users that they could restrict access to 
profile information,66 and because it failed to disclose the fact 
that users could no longer restrict access to their Name, Profile 
Picture, Gender, Friend List, and Pages.67  The policy was also 
considered unfair because it retroactively designated as public, 
information that had previously been held private, without 
users’ informed consent.68  The unfairness count could have been 
avoided if users had given informed consent to the re-
designation, something which Facebook would have had no 
difficulty obtaining.  The case ended with a Consent Order,69 
which included disclosure obligations, obligations to make 
certain information private, and also the requirement to 
establish “a comprehensive privacy program” to address some of 
the violations,70 coupled with the obligation to carry out impact 
 
65. Facebook Complaint, supra note 60. 
66. Id. at 6–7. 
67. Id. at 9. 
68. Id. 
69. In the Matter of Facebook Inc., F.T.C. No. 092-3184 No. C-4365 
(F.T.C., July 27, 2012) (Decision and Order).   
70. Id. at 5. 
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assessments twice a year for twenty years.71 
Notwithstanding these seemingly stringent requirements, 
in March 2018 a personality quiz app called 
“thisisyourdigitallife” was revealed to have been installed by 
300,000 people in 2013, enabling the data analytics and voter 
profiling firm Cambridge Analytica to obtain information about 
those 300,000 Facebook users and all of their Facebook friends.72  
In total this amounted to approximately 87 million user 
profiles.73  In December 2015, Facebook removed the app which 
was purportedly in breach of its Platform Policies and demanded 
assurances from all parties involved that the user information 
had been destroyed.  All parties certified to Facebook that they 
had destroyed the data, and the matter was put to rest.74  
Cambridge Analytica, however, had not deleted all user data,75 
and users were never notified of the breach or the data transfers 
until a leak in early 2018 caused public outrage.  Suddenly 
pressured for answers, Facebook offered partial responses.76  
Paul Grewal for instance asserted that there had been no breach 
on Facebook’s part: 
 
The claim that this is a data breach is completely 
false. [Cambridge Analytica] requested and 
gained access to information from users who chose 
to sign up to his app, and everyone involved gave 
their consent. People knowingly provided their 
information, no systems were infiltrated, and no 
passwords or sensitive pieces of information were 
 
71. Id. at 6. 
72. Paul Grewal, Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from 
Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Mar. 17, 2018 9:50 AM), 
https://perma.cc/JLJ8-HSJ9; Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer 
Data Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(Questions for the record response by Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman & Chief 
Executive Officer, Facebook). 
73. Nadeem Badshah, Facebook to Contact 87 Million Users Affected by 
Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2018 6:40 PM), https://perma.cc/F6AL-
72NS.  
74. Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (Questions for the record response by Mark Zuckerberg Hearing before 
the US House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce).  
75. Grewal, supra note 72.   
76. Id.  
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stolen or hacked.77 
 
Zeynep Tufekci reacted: 
 
Mr. Grewal is right: This wasn’t a breach in the 
technical sense. It is something even more 
troubling: an all-too-natural consequence of 
Facebook’s business model, which involves having 
people go to the site for social interaction, only to 
be quietly subjected to an enormous level of 
surveillance. (. . .) 
 
Despite Facebook’s claims to the contrary, 
everyone involved in the Cambridge Analytica 
data-siphoning incident did not give his or her 
“consent” — at least not in any meaningful sense 
of the word. It is true that if you found and read 
all the fine print on the site, you might have 
noticed that in 2014, your Facebook friends had 
the right to turn over all your data through such 
apps. (Facebook has since turned off this feature.) 
If you had managed to make your way through a 
bewildering array of options, you might have even 
discovered how to turn the feature off. This wasn’t 
informed consent. This was the exploitation of 
user data and user trust.78 
 
A reform of the FTC’s enforcement of consumer privacy thus 
seemed in order.  However creative the 2012 Consent Order had 
been, it had dramatically failed to prevent the harms caused to 
consumers from 2013 to 2018.  Religious faith in voluntary 
notice and choice provided Facebook with a shield to hide behind 
and continue to pursue its corporate interests on the backs of 
users. 
One year later, the FTC fined Facebook five billion dollars 
for non-compliance with the Consent Order and for other 
 
77. Id. 
78. See Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook’s Surveillance Machine, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/2ERY-T5TE.  
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violations under Sections 5 and 16 of the FTC Act.79  The 
settlement introduced a series of innovative compliance 
measures including monitoring of data sharing arrangements 
with third party developers and app providers; new channels to 
hold Facebook accountable, including a new Board of Directors 
committee focused on privacy risks; quarterly compliance 
certifications; and enhanced FTC access to internal documents.80  
Still, the measures were criticized as insufficient.81  Amongst 
other shortcomings was the recognition that the Order remained 
the result of a voluntary settlement, accepted, and acceptable to 
Facebook itself: 
 
Our colleagues lament that the Order does not do 
more. (. . .) As a civil law enforcement agency (and 
not a regulator), we can only get what we can win 
in litigation or via hard-fought negotiations. The 
FTC does not have the authority to regulate by 
fiat. The extent to which Facebook, or any other 
company, should be able to collect, use, aggregate, 
and monetize data, is something Congress should 
evaluate in its consideration of federal privacy 
legislation. Our 100 year-old statute does not give 
us free rein to impose these restrictions.82 
 
A self-regulatory and individual choice-centric approach to 
data and consumer harms remains predominant in the United 
States.  While legislative progress has been made at state level, 
 
79. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief at 1, USA 
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 91-cv-2184, 2019 WL 3318596 (D.D.C., July 24, 2019). 
80. Stipulation Order For Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgement, and 
Injunctive Relief, United States v. Facebook, Inc. (D.C. 2009) (No. 19-cv-2184). 
81. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the 
Matter of Facebook Inc., No. 092-3184 No. C-4365 (July 24, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/C59W-JUZE; Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rebecca 
Kelly Slaughter Regarding the Matter of FTC vs. Facebook, No. 092-3184 No. 
C-4365 (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/YD7L-DW33; see, e.g., Siva 
Vaidhyanathan, Billion-dollar Fines Can’t Stop Google and Facebook. That’s 
Peanuts for Them, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/2FXV-
M9BB. 
82. Statement of Chairman Joe Simons and Commissioners Noah Joshua 
Phillips and Christine S. Wilson Regarding the Matter of Facebook, Inc., No. 
092-3184 No. C-4365 (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/9PWC-ZMVK. 
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notably with the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) which 
came into force in early 2020, Federal legislation is yet to be 
seen.  As long as we rely on voluntary disclosures and individual 
choice, the full scope of the acts and activities we recognize as 
abusive will never be addressed. 
 
B. The European Approach to Consent 
 
1. Consent and Control under the GDPR 
 
Contrary to the United States approach, which favors 
voluntary privacy safeguards, European data protection law has 
developed as a principled umbrella body of law, following two 
influences.  First, the FIPPs, as first formulated in a report of 
US Department of Health Education and Welfare in 197383 and 
as subsequently reconfigured in the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of 
Personal Data,84 came to form the backbone of European data 
protection law.  Their three core principles of notice, consent, 
and purpose limitation still form the skeleton of EU data 
protection today.  Another important factor was the German 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the right to 
informational self-determination, which centered around the 
imperative of affording individuals the power to control 
information about themselves.85  “Natural persons should have 
control of their own personal data,” establishes Recital 7 of the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation, the much acclaimed 
new European umbrella privacy law.86  The idea of informed 
consent under EU data protection law is closely tied to that of 
informational self-determination.  As explained by the Article 29 
 
83. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Records, 
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory 
Comm. On Automated Personal Data Systems, No. (OS)73-94 (1973). 
84. OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), https://perma.cc/RM25-2ZPF. 
85. BVERFGE, 1 BVR 484/83, Oct. 18-19, 1983, 65 BVerfGE 1, available in 
German at: https://perma.cc/LT44-NX3K. See also Herbert Burkert, Privacy - 
Data Protection: A German/European Perspective, SECOND SYMPOSIUM OF THE 
GERMAN AMERICAN ACADEMIC COUNCIL’S PROJECT “GLOBAL NETWORKS AND 
LOCAL VALUES”, Woods Hole, Massachusetts 44 (1999). 
86. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7. 
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Working Party: “[t]he notion of consent is traditionally linked 
with the idea that the data subject should be in control of the use 
that is being made of his data. From a fundamental rights 
perspective, control exercised through consent is an important 
concept.”87 
In May 2018, the EU GDPR came into force, repealing the 
previous data protection regime88 and introducing a radical 
reconfiguration of privacy protection worldwide.  It reinforced 
the requirements for informed consent as one of the bases, and 
not the only basis,89 for legitimate data processing, and 
introduced new inalienable data subject rights that cannot be 
waived by consent.  It also expanded rights to access information 
about the personal data being processed, rights to rectify and 
erase personal data, the right to data portability, and the right 
to have human intervention in AI-based decision-making.90  The 
GDPR also introduced new compliance mechanisms: internal 
codes of conduct for companies;91 data protection impact 
assessments (DPIAs) whereby companies are encouraged to 
describe and evaluate aspects of their data processing practices 
likely to result in high risk;92 data protection seals and 
certifications overseen by apposite certification bodies;93 and 
perhaps most importantly data protection by design and by 
default which for example require setting up appropriate 
internal data minimization standards.94  The Regulation further 
requires each EU Member State to put in place a National Data 
Protection Authority (NDA) to ensure “the consistent 
 
87. EU Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent, 01197/11/EN WP187, at 8 (July 13, 2011). 
88. 1995 O. J. (L281) Directive 95/46/EC.  
89. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 6. 
90. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at arts. 12-23. 
91. Id. at art. 40. 
92. Id. at art. 35. See EU Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data 
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and Determining Whether Processing is 
“likely to result in a high risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17, WP 
248 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=611236. 
93. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at arts. 42-43. 
94. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 25. See also Gen. Data 
Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 5(c) (discussing the principle of data 
minimization in the GDPR). 
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application of [GDPR] throughout the Union.”95 
Under the GDPR, informed consent is one of six bases for 
lawful processing, the others being that the processing is 
necessary for the performance of a contract, for compliance with 
a legal obligation, or a closed list of other reasons including the 
pursuit of a legitimate interest of the person or entity 
responsible for data processing or a third party.96  Consent is 
required for the processing of special categories of personal data, 
for example data relating to racial characteristics, political or 
religious beliefs, and genetic and biometric data,97 but it is not 
required for the processing of other data which can be carried 
out under any of the other five bases of lawful processing.  The 
GDPR defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed 
and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by 
which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, 
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to 
him or her.”98  To be valid under the GDPR, an expression of 
consent must be informed, it must be specific and unambiguous, 
meaning that it cannot be sufficient to present individuals with 
pre-ticked boxes or to bundle consent with other actions,99 and it 
must be freely given, in that it must provide individuals with real 
choice and control, and must be uncoerced.100  Article 7 of the 
GDPR, which specifies additional conditions for the validity of 
consent, adds that in assessing whether consent is freely given, 
“utmost account shall be taken” of whether the processing is 
“necessary for the performance of that contract.”101  This amounts 
to saying that obtaining free and valid consent becomes more 
burdensome for a company as the data it acquires becomes 
 
95. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 51(2). See Gen. Data 
Protection Reg., supra note 8, at arts. 51-59 (explaining the powers and 
jurisdiction of national NDAs). 
96. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 6. 
97. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art, 9. 
98. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 4(11). 
99. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, Planet49 GmbH v 
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – 
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V, Case C-673/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:246 
(Mar. 21, 2019) (explaining the principles of specific consent and ambiguity), 
https://perma.cc/5K6D-DHQQ. 
100. See generally EU Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent 
Under Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP259 (Apr. 10, 2018). 
101. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7(4). 
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
2019 CONSENT AS A FREE PASS 339 
 
peripheral to the services it provides. Article 7 also specifies that 
there is a right to withdraw consent at any time,102 and that 
consent “shall be presented in a manner which is clearly 
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and 
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.”103 
EU data protection law as we see it today is characterized 
by fundamental rights protection coupled with a strong 
emphasis on informed consent, user choice, and control. Both 
consent and data subject rights assume that the individual can 
and should be the ultimate decision-maker regarding opaque 
commercial data practice, thus neglecting the power 
asymmetries and information externalities that make 
individual-centric decision-making objectionable.  It must be 
noted that this state of affairs is not a necessity; in theory EU 
data protection could be seen as centrally concerned with privacy 
defaults and one could understand consent under the GDPR as 
applying only in exceptional circumstances.  Yet the reality of 
the law’s current interpretation and implementation is different.  
While the Regulation does include compliance measures that go 
beyond individual control over data, the way such measures are 
to be implemented is still far from clear and so far remains up to 
the voluntary efforts of companies themselves.  Much of the case 
law on the GDPR since its coming into force has scrutinized the 
question of what constitutes legally compliant informed consent, 
without sufficiently questioning whether consent is the most 
appropriate basis for legitimating processing in given contexts.  
As the GDPR’s scope and mode of application is progressively 
clarified through the intervention of courts, regulators, and civil 
society amongst others, a shift away from consent and control 
seems unlikely, especially as these notions leak into neighboring 
legal fields such as competition enforcement.  In the long run, 
this enforcement strategy is likely to benefit companies more 
than consumers.  In what follows, we explore two cases that 
illustrate the shortcomings of an EU approach centered on 
individual informed consent. 
 
 
 
102. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7(3). 
103. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7(2). 
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2. Disclosure and Transparency: the French CNIL’s 
Decision against Google 
 
As the GDPR was coming into force, the French Data 
Protection Regulation, the “Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés” (CNIL) received two complaints, 
respectively by NOYB a non-profit based in Austria and the 
French la Quadrature du Net, both claiming that Google did not 
have a sound legal basis under the GDPR for engaging in 
processing of personal information as it did.  On January 21, 
2019, the French authority issued its first decision under the 
GDPR, and first amongst EU DPAs, imposing a fine of 50 million 
Euro against Google for failing to comply with the requirements 
for valid consent under the GDPR.104 
The substantive ruling in this case consists of two parts.  
First, CNIL decided that Google had failed to comply with its 
obligation to provide access to transparent information about 
data processing to users, because the information available to 
users was too disseminated, and was not clear and 
comprehensive.  Second, CNIL found that Google’s targeted 
advertising practices were not covered by valid consent.  It found 
that consent not only failed to be “informed,” but that it also 
failed to be sufficiently “specific” and “unambiguous” under the 
GDPR. 
We here expand on CNIL’s approach further.  First, 
therefore, CNIL found that Google did not make the required 
information easily accessible to users under Articles 12 and 13 
of the GDPR.105  Information essential to the exercise of data 
 
104. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés [CNIL] 
[French Data Protection Authority] Délibération de la formation restreinte n° 
SAN – 2019-001 prononçant une sanction pécuniaire à l’encontre de la société 
GOOGLE LLC, SAN-2019-001 (January 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/VHK7-
YUFE. 
105. See Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 12(1): “The 
controller shall take appropriate measures to provide any information referred 
to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 
relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible 
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, in particular for 
any information addressed specifically to a child. The information shall be 
provided in writing, or by other means, including, where appropriate, by 
electronic means. When requested by the data subject, the information may be 
provided orally, provided that the identity of the data subject is proven by other 
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subject rights, such as the purposes of data processing, the 
modalities of storage and the types of personal data used in 
targeted advertising could not be accessed in one single place 
and were instead disseminated across several documents, 
sometimes requiring up to five or six steps for a user to get 
relevant information on his or her data.  Further, the 
information provided by Google was not always clear or 
comprehensive.  Google’s processing operations span across 
about twenty services and entail the collection and use of a wide 
range of data, including data directly provided by users such as 
name and date of birth, data generated through a user’s 
activities such as geolocation, and data inferred on the basis of 
other data.  CNIL found that the information Google provided to 
users was too generic and vague to properly notify individuals of 
the processing at stake and of the importance of their consent to 
the practices’ legitimacy. 
Second, CNIL found that Google failed to obtain valid 
consent from users, and thus failed to engage in lawful 
processing when it relied on consent as a basis for lawfulness 
under Articles 6 and 7 of the GDPR.  Consent was considered 
invalid because it was not sufficiently informed (the information 
provided by Google to its users was lacking in accessibility and 
clarity) and it was insufficiently “specific” or “unambiguous.”  
When creating an account, users could click on the button “more 
 
means.” Article 13(1) GDPR reads: “Where personal data relating to a data 
subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when 
personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following 
information:  
- the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where 
applicable, of the controller’s representative;  
- the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable;  
- the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended 
as well as the legal basis for the processing;  
- where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by a third party;  
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;  
- where applicable, the fact that the controller intends to transfer 
personal data to a third country or international organisation [sic] and 
the existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or 
in the case of transfers referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second 
subparagraph of Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable 
safeguards and the means by which to obtain a copy of them or where 
they have been made available.” 
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options” to access certain data processing defaults and untick 
them.  However, CNIL considered that linking to pre-ticked ads 
personalization defaults placed an excessive burden on users’ 
ability to control processing on their personal data, and that 
under those circumstances consent to the defaults could not be 
considered specific and unambiguous. 
The requirements on information access, disclosure, and 
consent that underlie the decision are revealing.  While CNIL’s 
intention was to protect individual consumers, its decision 
appears problematic on at least two fronts.  First, the findings 
are highly design-sensitive.  CNIL grounds its arguments on 
how information is presented: browsing to a different page, the 
number of steps needed to access information, etc.  These criteria 
may be valuable, but they are ephemeral and easy to design 
around.  One could imagine information that is perfectly 
readable on the front page and yet remains impenetrable.  
Second, transparency on Google’s behavioral advertising 
practices is unlikely to ever be achieved, let alone through 
disclosure and consent.  Google has no incentive to disclose full 
and complete information about its most valued business model 
to its customers, users and competitors, and it has too much 
power to affect the shape of any disclosure it makes.  The 
information Google will disclose to users is unlikely to change 
much if the practice of notice and consent remains as it currently 
is. 
The problem is that by focusing on perfecting consent so that 
it complies with idealized informed consent, CNIL is leaving 
behind an essential part of the structural injustice.  The problem 
is not that individuals consent to opaque behavioral advertising 
as much as it is that behavioral advertising is harmful and 
should not be engaged in as extensively as it currently is.  As 
said, consent cannot serve a legitimizing role unless it operates 
under just background conditions.  Here, it is clear that users 
will keep accepting the terms set by Google in order to access its 
services, and Google’s interests will always prevail over any 
individual’s interests in the information disclosure.  CNIL’s 
focus on the criteria and nature of volition and informed consent 
seems to add moral legitimacy to a practice that acts as an empty 
vessel.  This approach will not do justice to individuals in the 
long run. 
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3. Monopoly Power: The German Bundeskartellamt 
Decision against Facebook 
 
Not long after CNIL’s decision, in February 2019 another 
decision considered a platform’s breach of EU consent 
requirements, this time however it was issued by an antitrust 
authority.106  In this much awaited case the German 
Competition Authority, or Bundeskartellamt, found that 
Facebook had violated German antitrust law by forcing those 
who wanted to access the Facebook platform to accept—through 
notice and consent—certain data collection and use practices 
such as the combination of data gathered through Facebook-
owned services including WhatsApp and Instagram and third 
party websites in one Facebook user-account.  Much of the 
Bundeskartellamt’s case is premised on user-control and 
consent, yet this time the analysis is pushed further and also 
scrutinizes the power asymmetries at play between users and 
Facebook.  In the authority’s words, “[t]here is no effective 
consent to the users’ information being collected if their consent 
is a prerequisite for using the Facebook.com service in the first 
place.”107 
In the decision, the Bundeskartellamt first finds that 
Facebook is dominant on the market for social networking 
services in Germany, with a market share of daily active users 
of ninety-five percent.108  Second, it finds that Facebook abuses 
its dominance by engaging in an abusive data policy, i.e. 
collecting user and device-related data from a variety of external 
sources, and conditioning access to their platform to their 
 
106. Prohibition Decision: Facebook Inc. i.a. - The use of abusive business 
terms pursuant to Section 19 (1) GWB, Bundeskartellamt (June 2, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/D8PK-D82G; See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: 
Facebook, Exploitative business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for 
inadequate data processing (Feb. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/JJN9-8URN; 
Bundeskartellamt, Press Release Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from 
combining user data from different sources (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/33YH-PDB9; Bundeskartellamt, Background information of 
the Facebook proceeding (Feb. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/HS94-EJNU. 
107. See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative 
business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing 
1 (Feb. 15, 2019). 
108. Id. at 3–7. 
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combining it with Facebook profile data.  The 
Bundeskartellamt’s foundational philosophy in this case is that 
“[i]n order to protect the fundamental right to informational self-
determination,109 data protection law provides the individual 
with the right to decide freely and without coercion on the 
processing of his or her personal data.”110 
The competition authority then argues that reliance on EU 
data protection law as a standard for determining the existence 
of exploitative abuse is justified and explains that consent under 
the GDPR cannot be voluntary and freely given if “users consent 
to Facebook’s terms and conditions for the sole purpose of 
concluding the contract.”111  Further, none of the other bases for 
lawful processing under Article 6 GDPR are present, 
particularly as the processing of all that user-data cannot be 
considered necessary for the performance of the users’ contract 
with Facebook.  Thus, Facebook’s processing violates data 
protection laws. 
The further step the Bundeskartellamt takes in its analysis 
is to consider such violation as evidence of an abuse of 
dominance, stating that what was required under German law 
was a showing that dominance and the violation of German law 
and data protection rules are causally related.112  The way the 
authority explains this causality is two-fold.  First, a reason why 
consent cannot be considered voluntary and freely given is 
precisely because Facebook is dominant on the market for social 
networking services.  If users had more options to avoid 
Facebook’s collection and processing of combinations of data 
then it is possible that there would be valid consent.  Second, 
those unlawful contracts allow Facebook to access, collect, and 
benefit from larger amounts of data than its competitors and 
arguably larger amounts of data than its users would agree to.  
The authority does not consider the particulars of how 
 
109. In 1983, the German Constitutional Court developed the right to 
informational self-determination relying on Articles 1 and 2 of the German 
Federal Constitution. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 484/83, Oct. 18-19, 1984, 65 BVerfGE 
1, available in German at: https://perma.cc/LT44-NX3K. 
110. See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative 
business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing 
8 (Feb. 15, 2019). 
111. Id. at 10. 
112. Id. at 11. 
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Facebook’s exploitative data policies (advertising, profiling) can 
harm individuals other than stating that the combination of 
these factors undermines users’ ability to “decide autonomously 
on the disclosure of their data.”113  In other words, the 
competition harm in question is a loss of user control over how 
their data is processed.  Andreas Mundt, President of the 
Bundeskartellamt, characterized the decision’s effect as an 
“internal divestiture of Facebook’s data.”114  The 
Bundeskartellamt’s goal in the decision in other words was to 
make the combination of data from different services across the 
web more difficult, and to give individuals real choices to 
disaggregate those datasets. 
While combining competition law and privacy in one 
decision is a very interesting new development, the decision’s 
focus on consent and loss of control appears to go both too far 
and not far enough.  It allegedly goes too far because it subsumes 
questions of data protection within the competition law analysis, 
a move that has been harshly contested on the grounds that it 
conflates two fields of enquiry, uncovers questions that 
competition law is unequipped to address, and leads to 
jurisdictional inconsistencies that would be better addressed 
through a different route.115 
The main problem, however, is that the decision does not go 
far enough.  On the one hand, the authority’s approach is 
ambiguous on whether Facebook’s monopoly status 
automatically makes users’ consent less free and voluntary.  In 
fact, larger companies hardly violate data protection law more 
consistently than smaller ones,116 even though they do have the 
 
113. Id.  at 12. 
114. See Bundeskartellamt Press Release Bundeskartellamt prohibits 
Facebook from combining user data from different sources (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/33YH-PDB9. 
115. See, e.g., Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Data 
Accumulation and the Privacy-Antitrust Interface: Insights from the Facebook 
Case for the EU and the U.S., 8 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 224 (2018); Jakob 
Kucharczyk, The German FCO’s Facebook Case: Blurring The Line Between 
Competition And Data Protection Enforcement, Disruptive Competition Project 
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/M9E8-JJYE; Geoffrey Manne, Doing Double 
Damage: The German Competition Authority’s Facebook Decision Manages to 
Undermine both Antitrust and Data Protection Law, TRUST ON THE MARKET 
BLOG (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/4RSS-U8AP.  
116. Justus Haucap, The Facebook Decision: First Thoughts, D’KART 
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ability to access, process, and control more information and, 
thus, arguably have greater compliance obligations.  The 
Bundeskartellamt’s approach, however, does not really tackle 
that point.  Its analysis is that dominance means that Facebook 
should not be able to impose unfair terms such as default data 
combinations as part of their terms of service, without offering 
viable alternatives and opt-outs. 
If the analysis is limited to giving individuals more options 
to aggregate and disaggregate datasets, than in important ways 
it seems to undermine the argument about power asymmetries. 
Indeed, the authority oscillates between two kinds of harms: it 
insists that the problem is coercion of users into an unfair 
bargain, yet defines the harm as a loss of control recoverable 
through the design of more choices at the consent stage.  A power 
imbalance requires more than a set of options to choose from, 
which is the remedy the authority puts forward in this case.  In 
light of Facebook’s power, increasing the number of choices will 
not solve the problem; users will keep opting for the least 
burdensome option amongst those that Facebook deems 
tolerable.  Choice and control should imply an ability to 
negotiate or walk away, but users do not have it, nor will they. 
Decisions that focus on “voluntary consent” as the desired 
goal, makes authorities vulnerable to responses, such as 
Facebook’s public response in this case, that users in fact have a 
lot of choice on these markets, and that other options are only a 
click away.117  The decision has now been overturned by the 
Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, which has offered a narrow 
analysis of consent and has entirely neglected the question of 
power in the platform economy.118  In proceedings for interim 
relief, the German court states that individuals in fact decide to 
opt into Facebook’s terms autonomously, and that Facebook’s 
data collection and combination practices have not been proved 
to harm Facebook’s competitors; concluding that the German 
Bundeskartellamt’s decision is, therefore, not good law. 
 
ANTITRUST BLOG (Feb. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/CB7N-FZ2W. 
117. Yvonne Cunnane & Nikhil Shanbhag, Why We Disagree With the 
Bundeskartellamt, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/XG8R-D9EH.  
118. Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Aug. 26, 2019, VI-Kart 1/19 (V), 
https://perma.cc/QGR7-FR54.  
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The court’s ruling confirms that correcting power 
asymmetries in the platform economy through consent is a 
fraught approach.  No matter what we think of the 
Bundeskartellamt’s innovative take, focusing on consent as a 
means of protecting individuals against platform power is 
reductive or vulnerable to criticism or both.  We must become 
readier, as a society, to move beyond informed consent and to 
ask what kind of platform economy individuals deserve, 
regardless of the choices they might be able or willing to make 
in such economy. 
 
C. Conclusions to Part II 
 
Regulators and courts in both the United States and Europe 
focus narrowly on the criteria for freely given consent instead of 
asking whether the practice of consent is justified in the 
platform economy.  Assuming the moral salience of a practice 
without asking whether it is justified in the circumstances, i.e. 
whether the background conditions for having the practice in the 
first place are just, unreasonably legitimizes it. 
It might be argued that the GDPR’s approach protects users 
and that it aims to achieve privacy by default with limited 
exceptions that consumers can consent to.  This aspirational 
vision hardly matches the way the legislation is currently 
interpreted and complied with.  Further, as long as 
voluntariness and disclosure are considered to be paramount, 
underlying questions of power and platform justice will remain 
obscured.  This should serve as a warning for US policy-makers 
currently considering federal privacy legislation. 
In what follows it will be shown that we in fact lack reason 
to understand the practice of notice and consent as legitimate in 
context under either of these regimes.  Taking the three 
conditions for the morally transformative force of consent in 
turn, it will be argued that the legal practice we described does 
not take place under just background conditions in the platform 
economy, it attempts to transform things which cannot be so 
transformed, and it unreasonably affects third parties who lack 
a chance to be heard under the circumstances. 
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III. What Should Consent Protect Us Against? 
 
Upon consideration, the legal practice of notice and consent 
seems a performative facade.  However, our conclusion in this 
regard may be wrong and requires careful examination.  To 
understand if there is reason to find the practice morally 
relevant in the platform economy, the first question we must ask 
is what consent is supposed to enable us to do.  What does it 
allow us to protect and what can it shield us from?  Considering 
notice and consent from this perspective allows us to realize that 
little of what consent allows us to do in fact serves our interests, 
and little of what we really need to do is enabled through notice 
and consent.  Consent enables us to access a platform in 
exchange for access to our data, yet it hardly transforms our 
relationship with platforms in a way that benefits us more than 
them, and it hardly seems capable of protecting us against 
abusive and covert interferences.  This discrepancy between 
what we have reason to want and what we actually tend to get 
through individual acts of consent will serve as important 
evidence to ground an argument about platform power and the 
lack of morally transformative force of consent in this context. 
 
A. Interests in Data 
 
Interests are what people value and care about.  Interests 
here will not be understood as what people selfishly or 
subjectively care about but rather as things people objectively 
have reason to value.119  Interests in dataflows and in the digital 
infrastructure can broadly be divided into three classes: (a) 
economic interests, individual or collective, over data and 
infrastructure as productive assets, including interests in the 
creation of new value through those data and infrastructure; (b) 
non-economic interests, mostly personal, in data or other 
infrastructure as constitutive of and/or significantly related to 
the shaping of one’s own person in one’s own eyes or in the eyes 
 
119. In this sense, I adopt Thomas M. Scanlon’s understanding of 
interests as objective things we have reason to value. See THOMAS M. SCANLON, 
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). This is in contrast to other views of 
interests as selfish motives. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1975). 
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of others; and (c) interests, mostly collective, in using data or 
infrastructure for the pursuit of non-economic common goals. 
These conflicting types of interests in data and 
infrastructure exist simultaneously: a hospital might have an 
economic interest, for instance a proprietary interest, over a list 
of patient names, treatments, and outcomes that one or more of 
their employees scrupulously compiled; Barbara, on the other 
hand, might have a non-proprietary data privacy interest in the 
display or not of her name and information on the list.  Both 
interests could be said in the abstract to reasonably justify 
claims that each the hospital and Barbara might have against 
one another. While there may be circumstances where it would 
be reasonable for the hospital’s claim to prevail, it seems that 
this would hardly be solely on economic or proprietary grounds, 
and that there would need to be other good reasons for 
overriding Barbara’s interest, e.g. that the health of the nation 
depended on the maintenance of such a detailed list of patient 
names, treatments and outcomes, or that substantial healthcare 
research and innovation were being made possible through such 
list. 
When it comes to the platform economy, notice and consent 
mechanisms are primarily used to allow claims based on 
economic interests (a) to prevail over claims based on personality 
or privacy interests (b).  Collective interests of type (c) are rarely 
promoted or clarified through notice and consent.  For instance, 
by consenting to Uber’s collection and use of our browsing or 
geolocation data, we effectively preclude local governments from 
being able to access such information on their own terms, forcing 
them instead to negotiate with Uber on Uber’s terms for data 
valuable to the collectivity.  In some ways, therefore, it seems 
that by centering the attention on individualistic interests, the 
act of consenting in fact leads to the neglect of broader societal 
interests of type (c).  On the other hand, as a hypothesis, 
interests of the non-economic (b) type appear to be protectable 
through consent.  These include interests in data privacy, 
interests in protection against certain forms of personalized 
microtargeting, interests against being treated in a 
discriminatory or biased way, interests in due process, etc.  As 
we will see, this hypothesis will prove largely incorrect.  None of 
these interests can really be protected through notice and 
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consent.  The interests that consent protects, if any, are the 
interests of individuals as consumers to purchase and try new 
products, and possibly the interests of individuals as political 
and cultural citizens to engage with others in a privately 
managed cultural and political public sphere.120 
Before turning to an analysis of the individual interests that 
arise in the platform economy, three further remarks can be 
made on the basis of the example of Barbara and the hospital: 
(1) interests in data can vary in importance; (2) as a general 
hypothesis, interests of the non-economic (b) type appear to have 
greater moral salience than interests of the economic (a) type; 
and (3) consent plays an important role in allowing less salient, 
or inferior, interests to take priority over allegedly superior ones. 
 
B. Online Interests and Online Harms: 
 
1. Consumer Interests 
 
For the sake of the argument in this Article, it will not be 
necessary to engage in an in-depth analysis of the nature and 
normative appeal of consumer interests in the context of the 
platform economy.  It suffices to say that individuals in market 
economies such as the United States and the European Union 
have an interest in being able to choose amongst a variety of 
available products and services as consumers subject to 
normative constraints set by fundamental rights, consumer 
welfare, and general standards of fairness in market practices. 
This also means that in a market economy, consumers’ 
interests in making autonomous purchasing decisions can be 
constrained by normative considerations such as safety, 
fairness, or human dignity.  Consumers in other words do not 
have an interest in being able to opt into or buy consumer 
products that have the potential to harm themselves or others.  
There are constraints on markets. An example are the very strict 
rules around food processing and labelling in both the United 
 
120. On the meaning of a digital public sphere. See Jack M. Balkin, 
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: a Theory of Freedom of Expression for 
the Information Society, 79 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Fixing 
Social Media’s Grand Bargain, Hoover Working Group on Nat’lSec., Tech., and 
Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814 (Oct. 16, 2018).  
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States and Europe, which forbid long distance sales of food that 
do not comply with certain regional or transnational standards 
of safety, origin, labelling, etc.  The same is true of products or 
services that violate other basic fundamental rights.  Consumers 
for example should not have the right to purchase products that 
are unacceptably manipulative or intrusive on their person or 
other persons. 
This point will be explored below, but it is important to 
understand that the interests of consumers in choosing or 
purchasing on a market do not exist in a vacuum and are 
constrained by a variety of normative considerations. 
 
2. Privacy 
 
A Western right to privacy enforceable in courts was first 
recognized by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in a famous 
piece in 1890.121  A century later or more, academics and non-
academics alike still debate the contents and contours of privacy 
law.  This subsection traces a brief genealogy of our 
understanding of privacy as an interest that requires 
institutional protection.  It traces the debate on privacy from 
questioning its very existence to understanding it as control over 
a personal sphere, to conceiving it as a more capacious right to a 
contextually reasonable flow of information about the self.  It 
will be argued that a view of privacy as control over the self is 
too limited to account for our objective interests in privacy, 
which have to do with what others can access and learn about 
us.  Thus, the boundaries of privacy cannot be managed through 
individualized decision-making but must be the fruit of a societal 
effort at redefining what fundamental rights mean and what the 
limits of markets must be in the 21st century. 
 
a.  Privacy Skepticisms 
 
In an article entitled “The Right to Privacy,”122 Judith Jarvis 
 
121. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
122. Judith J. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 295, 310 (1975). 
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Thomson famously expressed the view that there can be no 
unitary and coherent content to the right to privacy and, 
therefore, that, as a matter of theory, the right to privacy is an 
unhelpful construct.  In her view, privacy is a bundle of rights 
that intersects with other clusters of rights including the right 
to property and rights over the person; any interference which 
we understand as a violation of privacy in her view amounts to 
a violation of some other right (e.g. the right to exclude others 
from one’s body or possessions), or is overridden by other 
considerations (freedom of the press, voluntary disclosures of 
information to others).  The issue with such account of privacy 
is that it does not make sense of our intuition that privacy 
interests require protections that in certain circumstances go 
beyond the protections commonly afforded to property, 
reputation, or personal integrity; lending one’s car to a friend 
does not necessarily imply that the friend can look into every 
corner of the car and read any information left in there by 
accident.  Thomas Scanlon has addressed this point, arguing 
that although there may be no unitary and coherent right to 
privacy, there is a unitary and coherent set of interests which 
we have in privacy and which require institutional protection.123 
Yet even this view of a unitary set of interests in privacy has 
been doubted.  A number of economists and social scientists have 
been busy carrying out experiments showing that our 
preferences for privacy are elusive or nonexistent, and do not 
seem to match the purported solidity of our preferences for other 
market goods.  For instance, when privacy comes into conflict 
with other values such as the need to share information with 
others, Diana Tamir and Jason Mitchell have shown that 
disclosure tends to win because it provokes the activation of 
neural mechanisms associated with reward, such that humans 
are predisposed for self-disclosure.124  Some economists have 
shown that privacy preferences are not always reliable,125 yet 
 
123. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 315, 315 (1975). 
124. Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About 
the Self is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. of 
the United States of America 8038, 8038 (2012). 
125. Susan Athey et al., The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, 
Small Costs, Small Talk 1–26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 
No. 234882017), https://perma.cc/9UNW-K9SL. 
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others have been able to show that we have interests in placing 
limits on other people’s access to information about us.  While 
individuals at times give up personal data irrationally, they also 
at other times display exceptional commitment to shielding their 
information from access.126  Once a person has privacy they seem 
to want to keep it.127 
These findings tell us something about our revealed market 
preferences and whether or not we have stable preferences for 
privacy, but they do not tell us much about our objective reasons 
for valuing privacy, i.e. why we need to place limits on the 
extractive, exploitative, and manipulative extension of digital 
markets into our lives no matter what we tend to subjectively 
prefer or want on these very markets.  Without a theory on why 
and how to limit the expansion of digital markets, it seems we 
are missing an essential component of human life and resigning 
to alienation and hopelessness in an increasingly connected, 
dataveilled and colonized modern life. 
 
b.  Privacy as Control 
 
Because the contours of privacy are difficult to delineate 
though patterns of revealed preferences, many have thus 
wanted to understand privacy not as a set of stable ‘things’ we 
must protect but rather as being about the self-policing of 
personal boundaries, or control over a sphere of self-defined 
personal autonomy.  The idea that privacy is fundamentally 
about control is ubiquitous: the journalist Charlie Warzel 
defines privacy as being “about how . . . data is used to take away 
our control,”128 and tech CEOs like to emphasize “privacy 
controls” in their speeches on privacy.129 
A number of scholars have provided normative justifications 
for the claim that privacy is a right to individually control 
 
126. Acquisti et al., supra note 57, at 510. 
127. Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 
249, 264 (2013). 
128. Charlie Warzel, Privacy Is Too Big to Understand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
18, 2019), https://perma.cc/5MMG-5HH8. 
129. Josh Constine, Zuckerberg Says Facebook Will Offer GDPR Privacy 
Controls Everywhere, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/04/zuckerberg-gdpr/. See also Privacy 
Controls, GOOGLE, https://perma.cc/94KW-YFVU. 
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personal information.  For Alan Westin it is “the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others,”130 Jerry Kang defines it as “an 
individual’s control over the processing – i.e., the acquisition, 
disclosure, and use – of personal information.”131  Proprietary 
understandings of data are also strongly correlated to notions of 
control over information.132  Charles Fried’s account of the 
foundations of privacy illustrates the general understanding of 
privacy as a form of control.133  Fried rejects instrumental 
arguments such as Thomson’s that privacy is only a means to 
protect some other values, and instead advances a positive 
Kantian view of the right to privacy: to make most human 
relationships of respect, love, friendship, and trust meaningful 
we need to make space for an interest in privacy.  He states that: 
 
As a first approximation, privacy seems to be 
related to secrecy, to limiting the knowledge of 
others about oneself. This notion must be refined. 
It is not true, for instance, that the less that is 
known about us the more privacy we have. 
Privacy is not simply an absence of information 
about us in the minds of others; rather it is the 
control we have over information about 
ourselves.134 
 
Centrally, the emphasis on control is premised on a faith in 
individual decision-making as the default means for governing 
personal information.  Where Fried’s view starts to break down 
is in contexts where individuals can hardly be understood as 
 
130. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
131. JerryKang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REV 1193, 1203 (1998). 
132. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 17 
HARV. L. REV 2055, 2057 (2004); Lauren H. Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 1113 (2016); Jeff Sovern, Opting in, Opting out, or No Options 
at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 
(1999). 
133. Charles Fried, Privacy: A Moral Analysis, 77 YALE L. J. 475, 482 
(1968). 
134. Id. at 482. 
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good decision-makers.  In those circumstances, which are exactly 
the circumstances that this Article explores, we need to look for 
a different way to understand how the extension of markets into 
private life should be limited. 
 
c. Beyond Control 
 
When it comes to the digital economy, pervasive behavioral 
manipulability, enclosure, and conditioning of individuals have 
led more than one scholar to argue against an understanding of 
privacy as control. 
In her work, Julie Cohen shows that accounts based on 
individual control and consent are theoretically misleading.135  
One of her arguments is that grounding privacy on rational 
decision-making, autonomy, and dignity prioritizes some forms 
of autonomy, generally individual-centric interests in receiving 
information, over other autonomy interests, such as the interest 
in engaging and coexisting with others.  She points out that 
these autonomy-based accounts rarely show us how to 
adjudicate conflicts between different sets of autonomy 
interests.  As she puts it, “[i]nterrogating the conceptions of 
autonomy that exist in privacy theory exposes a deep conceptual 
poverty about what selves are made of.”136 
Helen Nissenbaum’s view of privacy as contextual integrity 
also goes beyond individualized preferences and control over the 
self.137  She argues that visions of privacy as control fail to 
account for the fact that privacy is not only about self-policing 
but also about how others access and experience information 
about us.  She envisions privacy as a right over a contextually 
appropriate flow of information, understood by reference to the 
notion of contextual integrity, which is a method for evaluating 
the appropriateness of existing informational norms in context.  
Informational norms, according to Nissenbaum, vary depending 
on the people between  whom information flows, the types of 
 
135. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: 
LAW, CODE AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012), ch.5 [hereinafter 
NETWORKED SELF]. 
136. Id. at 114. 
137. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: 
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). 
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information being shared and the normative principles 
governing the transmission of any given information.138  By 
applying a contextual approach to privacy, Nissenbaum is able 
to depart from control and to adopt a more holistic perspective 
on information governance. 
More broadly, what scholars such as Cohen, Nissenbaum or 
Shoshana Zuboff see as central to a normative understanding of 
privacy today is the need to limit the advancement of digital 
markets and the focus on economic efficiency in order to 
safeguard, protect, and honor human life in a commodified 
environment.  Rather than focusing on the empirical stability of 
our privacy preferences, or on the philosophical coherence of our 
privacy interests, we ought to focus on the reasonable limits that 
should be placed on extractive commercial incentives’ ability to 
erode spaces for the self. 
 
3. Interests in Enjoying the Benefits of the Informational 
Public Sphere without Suffering Manipulation, 
Microtargeting and other Algorithmic Harms 
 
Looking beyond the contested notion of privacy, we seem to 
have an interest in enjoying the benefits of the informational 
economy without suffering objectionable forms of manipulation 
and other harms such as algorithmic bias, discrimination, 
polarization, and lack of due process.  While we might want to 
understand notice and consent as being aligned with our interest 
in accessing online content, blank access to content, without 
protection from manipulation and other online harms, does not 
seem tolerable.  Insofar as notice and consent purports to allow 
us to access platforms without protecting us from these harms, 
its operation does not seem to align with our interests. 
 
a. Access to the Informational Public Sphere 
 
We have an interest, as members of social communities, in 
exchanging information, imparting, and being imparted 
information.  We have reasons, for instance, to access content on 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, or Google Search, in participating 
 
138. Id. at 140. 
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in discussions and making personal content available on these 
platforms. 
One philosophical justification for this interest can be found 
in John Stuart Mill’s notorious utilitarian defense of speech and 
freedom of conscience, that our ability to speak and develop 
thoughts without constraints is deeply connected to our 
individuality, and that suppressing speech and the ability to 
exchange information risks propelling us into tyranny.139  One 
could think this means that we need unrestrained access to as 
much content and opportunities for exchange as possible and 
that notice and consent practices’ limited interference with the 
ability of individuals to access platform content offers the ideal 
means of promoting our interest in accessing and participating 
in the informational public sphere.  Consent as an enabler of 
permissionless speech in other words seems to align with Mill’s 
vision of a liberal society. 
A Millian rationale for minimizing constraints on imparting 
and being imparted information rests on at least two false 
assumptions, however.  The first assumption is an unreasonable 
faith in the self-regulating free flow of opinions, or “marketplace 
of ideas,”140 i.e. the fact that opinions that are misleading or false 
can be corrected by allowing unrestrained flows of counter-
speech to progressively displace them.  This might have been 
empirically true in 1859 or in the 1920s when speech used to be 
channeled in a top-down manner through a limited number of 
closely controlled bottlenecks and when the main concern was to 
ensure that the information that reached individuals would 
remain as diverse as possible.  This is certainly no longer true in 
the platform economy, where the oversupply of ideas seems to be 
saturating the marketplace leading to purported ‘market 
failures.’141  Flows of counter-speech today are in fact leading to 
 
139. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
140. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
141. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1 Duke L.J. (1984) (discussing the notion of a failure of the marketplace of 
ideas); see also C. Edwin. Baker, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 164 (1989) (book review). 
Oreste Pollicino has been discussing the notion of market failures in relation 
to the issue of “fake news.” See Oreste Pollicino, Editorial, Fake News, Internet 
and Metaphors (to be handled carefully), 9 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. (2017). 
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greater polarization and conspiracies, rather than a healthy and 
pluralistic informational public sphere.142  Therefore, we may 
need to place constraints on users’ terms of access and 
participation that go beyond individual consent. 
The second related assumption is that speech can best be 
protected if the individual is recognized as the sole and ultimate 
source of authority regarding how and what information can be 
shared on the marketplace of ideas.  Platforms are constantly 
designing and manipulating the kinds of speech that is shared 
and accessed online, through design nudges and the intervention 
of their employees, reviewers, and algorithms.143  The 
information we access is always mediated by others, who have 
their own purposes and manipulative intentions.144  The 
likelihood that individuals will be manipulated when accessing 
a platform is indeed very high.  It is not factually accurate to 
understand individuals as the ultimate decision-makers 
regarding content flowing online. 
Richard Strauss argues that we must understand the 
interest in imparting and being imparted information as 
grounded in a Kantian principle of autonomy that individuals 
have a right to communicate and cultivate themselves as ends 
in themselves and never as means.145  By allowing individuals to 
be manipulated on digital platforms, we in fact allow others, e.g. 
Facebook or political propagandists, to treat these individuals as 
means instead of ends and to hinder their ability to determine 
their own life plans.  Thus, we must enable speech and 
 
142. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE 
AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017); YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: 
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2018); Claudio Lombardi, The Illusion of a “Marketplace of Ideas” and the 
Right to Truth, AMERICAN AFFAIRS J., Vol III (Spring 2019), 
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/the-illusion-of-a-marketplace-of-
ideas-and-the-right-to-truth/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
143. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 598 (2018); see also TARLETON 
GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, 
AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA (2018); Anupam Chander 
and Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of the Neutral Platform, 2 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 400 (2018). 
144. NICK COULDRY & ANDREAS HEPP, THE MEDIATED CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY (2016). 
145. David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991). 
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information exchange on platforms in a permissive way only to 
the extent permissionless exchange aligns with the imperative 
of respecting persons as ends and never to instrumentalize or 
manipulate them. 
Even if we were to reject Strauss’ Kantian principle of 
autonomy as a persuasive understanding of our reasons to 
access and share information in digital settings, we can infer 
from this discussion that we retain an interest in being shielded 
from certain forms of manipulation, coercion, and harm in spite 
of our interest in accessing platforms.  Consent cannot advance 
our interest in benefiting from the informational public sphere 
to the extent it subjects us to these risks. 
 
b. Manipulation 
 
What forms of coercion and manipulation do we have an 
interest in being shielded against? 
It seems that any understanding of manipulation on 
platforms must take into account the following dimensions of 
digital life: (1) technology makes the storage and display of our 
vulnerabilities in the form of digital traces not only possible but 
also relentless and permanent, (2) information asymmetries and 
partial information are pervasive, (3) our digital choices are 
distorted by design constraints so that we are not always or ever 
fully in control of our online decisions and their consequences, 
(4) lock-in mechanisms psychologically enclose us right after 
access constraining our ability and willingness to look for 
outside options, and (5) most if not all of our online choices 
impose costs on unaware third parties. 
Tal Zarsky has emphasized the importance of manipulation 
for understanding digital harms today.146  He defines 
manipulation broadly, as influence that is unfair or 
unacceptable, and he considers data-driven manipulation as 
substantially different from all previous forms of manipulation 
because it is hidden, personalized, and ubiquitous.147  Daniel 
 
146. Tal Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20.1 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157 (2019). 
147. See Karen Yeung, Hypernudge: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by 
Design, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 118 (2017) (discussing data-driven influence 
and data exceptionalism). 
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Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum have similarly 
argued that manipulation is particularly salient in digital 
environments.148  Manipulation to them is a deliberate hidden 
influence, and manipulating is the act of “intentionally and 
covertly influencing decision-making, by targeting and exploiting 
decision-making vulnerabilities.”149  This phenomenon is 
particularly prevalent in the platform economy. 
The focus of both these accounts on deliberate covert acts 
that are personalized and target vulnerabilities seems to 
capture part of what makes certain actions objectionable in the 
digital context; their covertness does not afford us an 
opportunity to understand the impacts they have on us, and to 
shape our lives accordingly.  In Stanley Benn’s view,150 which 
aligns with Richard Strauss’ above,151 when platforms 
deliberately manipulate us and use information about us in 
ways that we cannot fully understand, they impair our very 
understanding of ourselves and of the context that surrounds us, 
denying us respect as persons.  As Benn puts it, “to respect 
someone as a person is to concede that one ought to take account 
of the way in which his enterprise might be affected by one’s own 
decisions.”152  Further, “[o]ne cannot be said to respect a man . . . 
if one knowingly and deliberately alters his conditions of action, 
concealing the fact from him.”153  What makes manipulative 
interferences particularly objectionable in the platform context 
is that these interferences instrumentalize us for profit or other 
selfish motives, impairing our ability to shape our existence in 
accordance with our own plans, and thereby fail to afford us the 
respect we are owed as persons. 
To the extent manipulation is covert, can consent and 
disclosures solve it?  A move to transparent disclosure, assuming 
it is feasible, risks boosting even more opaque manipulative 
 
148. Susser et al., infra note 149; see also Daniel Susser et al., Online 
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019).  
149. Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Technology, 
Autonomy, and Manipulation, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2019). 
150. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in 
FERDINAND D. SCHOEMAN (ED.), PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY (1984). 
151. Strauss, supra note 145. 
152. Benn, supra note 150, at 229. 
153. Id. at 230. 
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techniques.  Julie Cohen notes that, as notice and consent 
became established in the United States as the dominant device 
for regulating corporate digital tracking techniques this 
practically incentivized “the quest to track internet users by less 
transparent means . . . pushing ever more deeply into the logical 
and hardware layers of consumers’ devices.”154 
To tackle manipulation and microtargeting on online 
platforms, therefore, we need to first look beyond terms and 
conditions and disclosures at how power and money are 
channeled through existing infrastructure and data and then to 
open-up and regulate those bottlenecks.  One such bottleneck is 
indeed the idealized and seamless practice of notice and consent.  
Other bottlenecks include data collection and profiling practices, 
ad-based business models, information-sorting algorithms, and 
the exploitative reliance on temporary contractors at scale. 
 
c. Bias, Discrimination, Lack of Due Process 
 
In parallel, and still beyond privacy, many scholars have 
uncovered and described a multitude of other hidden harms that 
result from the deployment of opaque automated algorithms at 
scale.155  When one clicks that they have read and understand 
Google or Facebook’s terms of service, one is in fact accepting 
these diffuse harms. 
Mittelstadt et al. identify at least seven concerns with the 
use of machine learning algorithms, including as deployed by 
 
154. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 56–57 (2019) 
[hereinafter TRUTH AND POWER]. 
155. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1314 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, infra note 159; 
Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 
(2018); Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the 
Debate, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y. (2016); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to 
the Algorithm: Why a Right to an Explanation is Probably Not the Remedy You 
Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2017); Sandra Wachter & Brent 
Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection in 
the Age of Big Data and AI, COLUM. BUS. L. REV., (forthcoming 2019); Frederike 
Kaltheuner & Elettra Bietti, Data Is Power: Towards Additional Guidance on 
Profiling and Automated Decision-Making in the GDPR, 2 J. OF INF. RTS, POL’Y. 
& PRAC. (2018); Reuben Binns, Fairness in Machine Learning: Lessons from 
Political Philosophy, 81 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. (2018). 
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platforms such as Google or Facebook.156  These include concerns 
about the biased and unfair nature of the outcomes of machine 
learning systems, which relate to how machine learning systems 
operate, but also to the training and input data used and the 
broader context within which machine learning is deployed; 
concerns with the “transformative effects” of machine learning 
systems such as effects on how we experience the political 
system and the world as mediated through these systems; and 
epistemological concerns relating to the evidence produced 
through machine learning systems including lack of 
explainability and interpretability of algorithms.  Other harms 
include chilling effects on speech, filter bubbles and 
polarization.157 
Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale’s work on technological 
due process describes algorithmic decision-making as entailing 
a variety of risks, including a very high tendency to perpetuate 
pre-existing inequalities and implicit biases through their 
opacity, arbitrary application, and disparate impacts:158 
“[s]coring systems can have a powerful allure – their simplicity 
gives the illusion of precision and reliability. But predictive 
algorithms can be anything but accurate and fair. They can 
narrow people’s life opportunities in arbitrary and 
discriminatory ways.”159  These harms in turn have prompted 
inquiries into novel forms of due process in opaque digital 
environments where individuals are unable to foresee the 
harms. 
Karen Yeung considers some of the novel threats posed by 
big data and algorithms through the lens of the “hypernudge.”160  
Algorithms operate through a recursive feedback loop that 
extends in three directions: constant refinement of the choice 
 
156. Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping 
the Debate, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y. (2016). 
157. See, e.g., Kaltheuner & Bietti, supra note 155, at 2; Opinion of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/85MP-
R5VA. 
158. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 
85 WASH. U.L. REV. 1249 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, infra note 159. 
159. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014). 
160. Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by 
Design, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y. 118 (2016). 
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environment, constant data feedback to the choice architect, and 
constant comparison of the individual’s choice environment to 
wider population trends.  In so doing, these systems also 
inherently shape our cognitive environment within platforms, 
nudging us toward pre-designed choices and decisions.161  
Tufekci similarly provides an account of platform-related 
algorithmic harms dividing them into two broad groups:162 
concerns with lack of visibility, information asymmetries and 
hidden influences on the one hand and concerns with inferences 
and profiling on the other.  Many of these harms overlap closely 
with manipulative harms and respect for persons, as discussed. 
 
C. Conclusions to Part III 
 
Overall, it seems that when an individual clicks and accepts 
certain terms and conditions and consents to a platform’s 
privacy policy, they are in fact agreeing to a number of hidden 
forms of intrusive and manipulative data collection, use and 
storage practices, interferences, and opaque treatments.  As a 
result, it may lead to various harms to oneself and to others, 
including losses of respect and dignity, discriminatory impacts, 
and other systemic effects connected to commodification and the 
erosion of spaces for the self.  In these circumstances, we must 
seriously question whether the emphasis on individualized 
notice and consent as a device which enables access and choice 
is appropriate and whether even the most extensive disclosure 
and the most freely given consent is actually sufficient to protect 
us from diffuse and systemic harms in the platform economy. 
As said in Part I of this Article, consent’s magic is that it can 
transform the relationship between two or more people and 
change the justifications each of them, as well as external 
observers, have for their respective behaviors.  In the platform 
context, this hardly seems the case.  It certainly seems to 
 
161. Karen Yeung shows that like any other regulatory design 
mechanism, algorithms possess three “cybernetic” features: information 
gathering and monitoring, standard-setting, and behavior modification. See 
CHRISTOPHER HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT 
OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES (2001). 
162. See Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and 
Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational Agency, 13 COLO. TECH. L. J. 
203 (2015). 
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legitimate companies’ practices, but hardly empowers 
individuals to make real choices in the platform economy on how 
to structure their relationship with these companies.  The gap 
between what we have reason to want and what we seem to 
actually prefer in the platform economy, between what we get 
and what platforms get, points to an underlying power struggle.  
It is in the context of this power struggle, therefore, that notice 
and consent mechanisms have acquired a special importance, as 
a solution that appears to make practical sense on its face and 
that in fact acts as a free pass that promotes the political and 
economic interests of large data conglomerates.  By accepting 
the terms and conditions, individuals pursue their consumer 
preferences and are given the right to access platform content at 
the cost of giving up on fundamental human interests in being 
treated with respect, not being discriminated and manipulated, 
and not being subjected to covert harms that they cannot 
properly be warned of.  Although some might consider these 
harms tolerable, the next section explains why they cannot be 
deemed tolerable to everyone. 
 
IV. The Mirage of Transformation 
 
We said that consent’s transformative moral force requires 
the embodiment of at least three things: (a) the possibility of 
free, autonomous consent given under just background 
conditions; (b) the interests, rights, and states of affairs 
purportedly being transformed, can actually be transformed by 
the consent; and (c)  the consent does not unreasonably harm 
third parties.  Having articulated some of the things we might 
want to see protected in the platform economy, it seems that 
most of these things are not of a kind that can be alienated or 
transformed, and that some are diffuse and collective in kind, 
meaning that their disposal through individualized notice and 
consent can significantly harm third parties.  Respect, dignity, 
and non-discrimination are arguably so essential that they give 
rise to thick institutional protection in the form of inalienable 
rights.  Other interests, such as those in having a say over how 
data is collected and used or in preventing extensive 
commodification and datafication are collective concerns that 
might not be strictly inalienable but require collective 
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governance solutions.  This section examines the collective 
dimensions and the inalienable interests that notice and consent 
purportedly transform, showing that consent lacks morally 
transformative force in relation to these concerns and simply 
acts as a performative façade that normalizes the platform 
economy. 
 
A. Collective Goods and Collective Governance 
 
An important reason for doubting the transformative force 
of notice and consent in the platform economy is that the erosion 
of privacy, the commodification of personal data, and the 
increasing colonization by markets of spaces for the self all seem 
to be affecting people collectively, by on the one hand creating 
isolation, personalization, and the loss of a sense of community 
and on the other hand maintaining artificial interpersonal 
connections through opaque data patterns.  A concern is that 
managing data in an individualized way, through notice and 
consent, only increases these problems, accentuating isolation 
and the fragmented management of diffuse harms.163  More 
concretely, data can be about a variety of individuals at once, 
and the consent of some may result in consequences that affect 
others.  This issue arose as part of the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal:164 when individuals agreed to use Kogan’s quiz app and 
letting the app access their personal information, they also 
agreed to the app’s access to personal information about their 
friends whose Facebook settings allowed it.  This is what Maggie 
Koerth-Baker called the “privacy of the commons”165 problem, 
defining it as: 
 
 
163. See Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1 (2019); Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 11; see also Julie E. 
Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); NETWORKED SELF, 
supra note 135. 
164. Nadeem Badshah, Facebook to Contact 87 Million Users Affected by 
Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/08/facebook-to-contact-the-
87-million-users-affected-by-data-breach. 
165. See infra note 166; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243.full.pdf. 
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what happens when one person’s voluntary 
disclosure of personal information exposes the 
personal information of others who had no say in 
the matter. Your choices didn’t cause the breach. 
Your choices can’t prevent it, either. Welcome to a 
world where you can’t opt out of sharing, even if 
you didn’t opt in.166 
 
It has also long become apparent that the more personal 
data a business can link together through network effects, the 
more the usefulness of any datapoint within that network 
increases.  Google search is a good example of a service whose 
quality increases for searchers in proportion of the data Google 
accumulates about other people’s searches.  This also means 
companies have an incentive to abuse the collective dimensions 
of data by letting each user generate information about others. 
The collective nature of privacy and data harms points in 
the direction of collective mechanisms for managing data 
instead of individualized notice and consent.  Framing data as a 
commons owned by communities of people, and developing 
initiatives such as data cooperatives, trusts and collective 
management schemes give us reason to hope.167  However, the 
devil in these cases is in the details: Are these initiatives giving 
power to people to change current incentives and commercial 
structures?  Do they lead to a mere redistribution of value from 
the top or do they create opportunities to re-frame our 
understanding of value? 
 
1. Liberal Rights and Collective Governance 
 
The collective nature of privacy harms is a very powerful 
reason for rethinking the centrality of notice and consent, 
resisting an understanding of privacy as control over data, and 
 
166. Maggie Koerth, You Can’t Opt Out Of Sharing Your Data, Even If 
You Didn’t Opt In, FIFTHYTHIRTYEIGHT (May 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/7UNW-
2WBJ. 
167. See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE VALUE OF EVERYTHING: MAKING 
AND TAKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018); Benedetto Vecchi, I Dati Sono un 
Bene Comune e Appartengono ai Cittadini, IL MANIFESTO(Nov. 6, 2019); Dᴇᴄᴏᴅᴇ 
Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, https://decodeproject.eu/ (last visited Nᴏᴠ. 25, 2019).  
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looking to collective management solutions.  However, when it 
comes to minimizing data collection and limiting excessive 
intrusions or commodification of data, there are good reasons to 
keep taking rights seriously.  The primary reason for this is that 
some understandings of collective self-management do not 
account for the value of certain fundamental interests of 
persons, such as the interest in dignity and in being respected 
as a person and not manipulated, commodified, or harmed for 
profit.  Data collectives can indeed function as a coherent 
community while having as their primary purpose the 
monetization and exploitation of collective data.  While this may 
seem individually acceptable to some, allowing the data of a 
group to be exploited for profit can mean denying dignity and 
respect to members of that group including some who willingly 
accepted it and others.  Another way of putting it is to say that 
if Facebook were to become a collective, or if a collective were to 
engage in the same data intrusive practices as Facebook during 
the Cambridge Analytica episode, a collective would not 
eliminate the disvalue of those activities for the group and its 
single members.  Group membership does not prevent practices 
that violate certain inalienable rights of persons. 
Liberal theorists such as Joseph Raz, Thomas Scanlon, John 
Rawls, and others have developed nuanced understandings of 
the relationship between individual entitlements and the 
collective good.168  Each of them has argued that taking 
individual rights seriously does not entail an abdication of 
collective values, and, factually speaking, in most circumstances 
the collective good overrides individualist pursuits.169  Raz 
understands morality as primarily non-individualistic and non-
rights-based but still recognizes the important role that rights 
play in protecting the fundamental value of each person.  
Focusing on “interests” as a basis for rights allows him to make 
sense of the fact that some interests do not bear only on 
individuals but also on groups and that only a subset of these 
 
168. See RAZ, supra note 21, at 163; see also THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE 
OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
169. An example is John Rawls’ difference principle, which posits that 
welfare increases, to be justified, must benefit the least advantaged at least as 
much if not more than the more advantaged. See Samuel Freeman, Illiberal 
Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
105 (2001). 
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interests require individual rights protection.  Some interests 
can be valued and vindicated through means such as collective 
organizing.  Rights can also have a collective dimension, socio-
economic rights are an example.170 
 
B. Inalienable Rights 
 
Another important reason for resisting consent is that some 
of the interests that it purportedly allows us to pursue, or the 
rights it purportedly allows us to transform, are constitutive of 
our person and thus inalienable; they are so fundamental to who 
we are that they cannot be disposed of through acts of the will.  
It is useful to explain why we have inalienable rights not to be 
manipulated or harmed in the platform context. The following 
clarifies the debate on inalienability by articulating what it 
means to have an inalienable right, relying on the example of 
our inalienable right against manipulative intrusions. 
 
1. Controversies over Alienability 
 
Privacy as a basic fundamental right is guaranteed in equal 
measure to all under several state constitutions and 
international charters.171  The text of the California State 
Constitution even stipulates that “[a]ll people are by their nature 
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these 
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining 
safety, happiness and privacy.”172  Values such as personal 
integrity,173 human dignity, and self-determination174 have also 
 
170. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
171. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12, Dec. 10, 
1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention on Human Rights art 8, Nov. 4, 
1950. 
172. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
173. See Helen Nissenbaum’s account of privacy as contextual integrity. 
NISSENBAUM, supra note 137. 
174. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVᴇʀꜰGE][  Federal Constitutional 
Court] October 18-19, 1983, 65 BVᴇʀꜰGE 1 (Ger.). See also IMMANUEL KANT, 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785) (discussing the 
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been considered inalienable.175 
A right is inalienable if it is so basic as to constitute what it 
means to be a human.  For Immanuel Kant, the inalienability of 
rights is required to ensure that each person maintains their 
equal status as persons with equal dignity: one cannot give up 
one’s capacity for freedom because giving away freedom means 
giving away humanity.176  John Stuart Mill also recognizes 
limits to our capacity to trade away aspects of our freedom 
irreversibly; one cannot enslave oneself, for example, because it 
would mean giving up being a free person for good.177  
Inalienability in other words is what ensures that people are 
treated as humans with equal basic rights instead of as means, 
slaves, or property.178 
When it comes to data and privacy, inalienability has been 
doubted or defined narrowly.179  One possible reason is that 
there is serious disagreement over whether trading away one’s 
data or giving up aspects of one’s privacy entails losing core 
aspects of freedom or well-being.  Part of the disagreement is due 
to the fact that we currently live our lives in an environment 
that already commodifies us for various commercial purposes.  
The question that divides us then is whether or not such 
commodification is objectionable and denies us essential privacy 
protections.  It is argued here that it does, and that a compelling 
understanding of privacy requires an account of what it means 
for aspects of our privacy to be inalienable. 
 
 
 
philosophical notions of dignity and self-determination). 
175. Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not 
a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (2001); see also Conseil d’Etat, supra 
note 34. 
176. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 98 (John 
Ladd trans., New York Library of Liberal Arts, 1965) (1797). 
177. MILL, supra note 139, ch. 5. See also BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND 
EQUALITY 148 (2001), in relation to the right of exit inherent in the freedom to 
associate; Hallie Liberto, The Problem with Sexual Promises, 127 ETHICS 
(2017) (discussing the withdrawal of sexual promises). 
178. Freeman, supra note 169, at 113. 
179. See, e.g., Václav Janeček & Gianclaudio Malgieri, Data Extra 
Commercium, DATA AS COUNTER-PERFORMANCE – CONTRACT LAW 2.0?  
(forthcoming 2019); Aᴅᴀᴍ D. Mᴏᴏʀᴇ, Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ, Iɴᴛᴇʀᴇꜱᴛꜱ, ᴀɴᴅ Iɴᴀʟɪᴇɴᴀʙʟᴇ Rɪɢʜᴛꜱ 
(2018). 
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2. The Right against Manipulative Intrusions 
 
Thomas Scanlon, like Joseph Raz, offers an interest-based 
theory of rights which both clarifies the relationship between 
interests and rights and helps uncover what the inalienable core 
of our online rights might be about.180  As said in Part III, 
interests are what people value and care about, not what they 
selfishly or subjectively want but what they objectively have 
reason to value.  Scanlon defines rights as “constraints on 
discretion to act that we believe [are] important means for 
avoiding morally unacceptable consequences.”181  To claim a 
right violation for Scanlon means to claim three things: (1) that 
a discretionary course of action by private or institutional actors 
leads to unacceptable consequences, (2) that constraints over 
such discretion are possible, and (3) that said course of action in 
fact violates such constraints.182  Scanlon believes a right has 
three essential components: (1) an ends, i.e. interests, harms, 
goals or values that makes us consider given consequences as 
unacceptable and given constraints as justified (e.g. the interest 
in privacy, the interest in the prevention of manipulative 
interferences); (2) a means, i.e. constraints the right is said to 
involve in order to protect the ends (e.g. notice and consent, data 
minimization requirements, access to judicial enforcement); and 
(3) a link between empirical beliefs as to possible unacceptable 
consequences and beliefs as to consequences of the constraints 
the right proposes.  Thus, for Scanlon determining the existence 
and boundaries of a right is an exercise in reflective 
equilibrium183 which must be grounded in a preliminary inquiry 
into the interests we have in constraining unreasonable actions 
that interfere with these interests.  Given the significant 
empirical component of rights, Scanlon recognizes that the 
determination of rights necessarily entails a degree of “creative 
instability” and that rights have a protean, dynamic existence 
that can never be fully captured. 
 
 
180. Tʜᴏᴍᴀꜱ M. Sᴄᴀɴʟᴏɴ, Content Regulation Reconsidered, in THE 
DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 151 (2003). 
181. Id. at 151. 
182. Id. at 152. 
183. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 42–45. 
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a. The Ends: Protection against Manipulative 
Intrusions 
 
This subsection shows that data privacy is coextensive with 
protection from data-driven manipulative practices online, and 
explains what these interests are about and why they are 
inalienable. 
In an early piece, Scanlon developed an understanding of 
the right to privacy, linking our interests in privacy to 
enforceable constraints on the power to interfere with such 
interests.184  Scanlon presents his views on privacy in response 
to Thomson’s critique of the right to privacy outlined above, yet 
he does not go far beyond arguing that the unitary nature of 
privacy can be found in a set of special interests we have in being 
able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions.185  Such interests 
include specific interests in not being seen, overheard, etc., and 
also broader interests in having a conventionally defined “zone 
of privacy in which we can carry out our activities without the 
necessity of being continually alert for possible observers, 
listeners, etc.”  Scanlon emphasizes the importance of convention 
to define “a zone of privacy immune from specified interventions.”  
He also notes that technological advances may require us to 
extend old conventions or to change them in the face of a new 
situation.186 
There is something intuitively appealing in the idea that 
privacy’s unitary nature can be found in the need to be protected 
against certain kinds of intrusions and interferences, and that 
any potential “zone of privacy” must be defined and understood 
within a given social context. Yet this must be qualified in two 
ways. First, we must tread carefully when speaking of “zones” of 
privacy in order not to obscure the diffuse and invisible nature 
of privacy violations and manipulative interferences in the 
platform economy.  It is helpful for example to expand our 
understanding of privacy beyond spatiality by considering Helen 
Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as claims to appropriate flows of 
information about oneself,187 or Mireille Hildebrandt’s 
 
184. See Scanlon, supra note 123; See Thomson, supra note 122. 
185. Thomson, supra note 122. 
186. See THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 204 (1998). 
187. NISSENBAUM, supra note 137. 
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understanding of privacy as the freedom from unreasonable 
constraints on the construction of one’s identity.188 
Second, we need a criterion for distinguishing what is 
within the zone of reasonable privacy protection from what is 
outside of it.  While Nissenbaum relies on the notion of 
“contextual integrity,” her theory does not distinguish, other 
than on a case-by-case basis, between aspects of privacy that we 
can give up consensually and aspects of privacy that we ought 
not to be able to give up at all, i.e. alienable and inalienable 
aspects of privacy.  Stanley Benn instead provides a normative 
criterion for this distinction which seems useful here.189  His 
account grounds privacy in a Kantian understanding of respect 
for persons, i.e. the need to ensure that persons are treated as 
ends in themselves and never instrumentalized for the pursuit 
of someone else’s aims.  As seen, respect in the Kantian sense 
means treating a person as an end and allowing that person to 
choose her own ends.  In the platform economy, respect means 
ensuring that each person is physically and mentally enabled to 
pursue a life of their own through a sufficient level of self-
awareness and understanding of their environment, sufficient 
space for independent thinking, etc.  Thus ensuring that a 
person can flourish and make independent decisions about their 
life. 
Data privacy seems, therefore, to be coextensive with 
protections against manipulative intrusions based on personal 
data, such as microtargeting or other behavior that undermines 
dignity and the capacity for self-awareness.  Data surveillance 
and related manipulation should not be capable of being 
consented or opted into, to the extent they remain covert and 
blur the ability of individuals to make decisions regarding who 
they want to be, how they should vote, purchase, and more 
broadly how they want to conduct their lives.  Protection against 
forms of interference that instrumentalize human life should 
prevail over a person’s initial choice as a consumer to access a 
platform’s gated services not knowing what might come next. 
An even bolder line of argument on inalienability consists in 
saying that most if not all forms of data commodification lead to 
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LAW (2015). 
189. Benn, supra note 150. 
66https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
2019 CONSENT AS A FREE PASS 373 
 
objectionable discriminatory treatment of persons, and that 
because such treatment is intolerable, no person should be 
allowed to accept it.  A particularly salient case here is the way 
markets over data seem to incentivize people in need to give up 
their privacy while others maintain higher levels of protection, 
thus advantaging the rich.190  The resulting inequalities and the 
surreptitious discriminatory treatment that might result from 
them in digital environments are important reasons for treating 
privacy and protection from manipulative intrusions as largely 
inalienable and as needing to be advanced in equal measure for 
all. 
 
b.  The Means: Beyond Notice and Consent 
 
Having identified these special interests, the next step 
consists in asking how to design constraints that can prevent 
interferences with them.  This question can be taken at varying 
levels of abstraction but is fundamentally about which 
institutions can ensure protection of given interests and how.  As 
importantly emphasized by Julie Cohen, when thinking about 
how to protect our privacy, we must be aware that our 
understanding of it is in large part shaped by the universe of 
possible intrusions that current institutions, laws, and markets 
enable.191  We must, therefore, be particularly imaginative—not 
take existing intrusions as to what privacy is but rather keep 
exploring what privacy might be, and how technology companies 
might respond to the introduction of new institutional, legal or 
technical, protections. 
A Scanlonian approach to the means of data privacy 
protection prompts us to ask three questions about consent and 
its alternatives.  First, whether, and to what extent, notice and 
consent can constitute a reasonable protection against existing 
and possible future interferences with our interests.  Second, to 
the extent notice and consent is insufficient to protect us against 
harm, we must ask what alternatives it might be reasonable to 
put in place to protect them.  Third, when thinking about 
 
190. See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 
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191. See TRUTH AND POWER, supra note 154. 
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implementing these alternatives, an important question is also 
who should be in charge of determining, designing and deploying 
these alternatives. 
Regarding the first question, in the case of inalienable 
rights the answer is intuitive: to the extent these interests are 
inalienable, they cannot be given up through contractual 
agreements or acts of consent.  Instead, to protect them we must 
put in place institutional protections that at least narrow the 
scope of the intrusive practices in question and at best render 
them unlawful and promote a reconfiguration of digital business 
models.  Transparency and disclosure cannot protect platform 
users in this sense. 
Potential answers to the second and third questions, above, 
will be developed further in Part V of this Article. 
 
c.  The Residual Case against Privacy Self-
Management 
 
We are left with the following two questions concerning 
aspects of privacy or online harms that are neither collective nor 
inalienable.  First, if there are such aspects, what do they consist 
of?  Second, to what extent can we legitimately disclose or 
consent to intrusions into these aspects of our private lives 
without giving up our core inalienable interest in data privacy 
and against manipulative intrusions? 
Nothing said so far about inalienable rights amounts to 
saying that privacy is inalienable in its entirety.  Under 
Nissenbaum, Scanlon’s or other accounts, we may still be 
understood to have certain alienable interests in keeping certain 
information about ourselves private only as long as we choose 
not to disclose it.  It seems legitimate to be able to alienate 
information in various ways: I may have a disease and choose to 
disclose the fact to my doctor, I may show a photo of my dress to 
a group of friends, I may invite a colleague into my home for 
lunch or tell them facts about my private life.  If these 
disclosures were to be done by way of consent, e.g. a doctor 
asking about my disease, my friends asking if they can look at a 
photo, or a colleague asking if she can come into my house, then 
these would be instances where my consent would be performing 
its morally transformative role.  However, none of these cases 
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are cases of use or access to personal data in digital settings.  
The digital environment has rendered the question of alienation 
less straightforward. 
When it comes to the Internet, there are good reasons to be 
able to decide how to share personal content on Facebook or 
Twitter, but we should distinguish between decisions about 
online content and decisions about online data, including 
metadata, geolocation and tracking data, inferred data, and 
behavioral data.  Choosing to share information with an 
audience, on an online platform or elsewhere, does not mean 
accepting to be subjected to surreptitious targeted 
advertisement or inferences based on that information.  While 
the first is a choice, the second is the result of a business model 
that undermines our ability to make informed choices. 
Thomson relies on an example that can help clarify some 
misunderstandings. Her example is as follows: 
 
[I]f my husband and I are having a loud fight, 
behind open windows, so that we can easily be 
heard by the normal person who passes by, then if 
a passerby stops to listen, he violates no right of 
ours, and so in particular does not violate our 
right to privacy. Why doesn’t he? I think it is 
because, though he listens to us, we have let him 
listen (whether intentionally or not), we have 
waived our right to not be listened to - for we took 
none of the conventional and easily available 
steps (such as closing the windows and lowering 
our voices) to prevent listening.192 
 
For Thomson, leaving the windows open amounts to waiving 
a right which could be understood as a right to privacy.  First, 
let us suppose the windows had been opened intentionally to let 
people listen.  In that case, by inviting someone to cross a 
conventional boundary, to listen to my private conversation, I 
have waived the right to complain about the boundary crossing 
itself.  When I invite my neighbor to dinner at my house, I cannot 
reasonably complain that my neighbor is inside my house having 
 
192. Thomson, supra note 122, at 306. 
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dinner.  When I post a video publicly on YouTube, I cannot 
complain that people are looking at it.  In these cases, I still have 
reasonable grounds to complain, however, when my neighbor 
picks up my tax returns on a table and reads them, or when 
YouTube starts showing me adverts based on the video’s 
contents.  A voluntary and intentional invitation to cross a 
privacy boundary can be understood as a waiver of the right to 
complain about that specific voluntary disclosure but it does not 
extinguish all claims to privacy within that sphere.  There is in 
other words no window the voluntary opening of which, nor any 
box the voluntary ticking of which, extinguishes all of our 
alienable and inalienable interests in data privacy or makes any 
and all invasions of our data privacy interests reasonable. 
As we have seen, the harm we need protection against is not 
only a privacy harm but includes manipulative intrusions.  A 
mere failure to take conventional precautions against 
intrusions, such as leaving a window open, cannot amount to a 
waiver of a right to prevent intrusions in a dynamic and opaque 
space such as the platform economy where we cannot know 
which kinds of intrusions might exist let alone be harmful.  
Platforms are not apartments, they are more like open plans 
with invisible windows always open by default.  Even though 
windows can in some cases be closed with some effort by 
individuals with acute vision or sophisticated tools, this may be 
a world to complain about, our interest in being respected as 
persons and in not being covertly used or instrumentalized for 
others’ selfish motives arguably being interfered with on an 
ongoing basis.  Many people might never see windows being 
open, some people may see them, yet have a hard time closing 
them.  All these people have reason to complain because they 
can envisage an alternative world where windows are not 
invisible or not always open by default.  Yet in this hypothetical 
world, those who control the construction of windows prefer the 
world as it is, with default invisible open windows.  These same 
entities who control the construction of windows in turn see 
notice and consent very favorably; it allows them to justify the 
status quo without incurring any liability or harm.  It acts as a 
free pass on their otherwise illegitimate behavior. 
We, therefore, should resist an expansive understanding of 
our alienable interests in privacy in the platform economy for at 
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least five reasons.  First, in this context there are very few 
aspects which we choose to disclose about ourselves that have no 
impact on others.  Even willingly sharing certain kinds of 
information on platforms has effects on the information 
ecosystem of others, including how algorithms will make 
predictions about people with similar tastes.  Second, choices to 
disclose information on platforms are not always clearly 
autonomous and are often induced by the behavior of others, or 
by psychological nudges that prompt us to keep logging in.  
Third, alienable privacy aspects can have discriminatory effects 
through data and algorithmic processing.  Any information we 
disclose can lead to asymmetric treatments or biases.  Markets 
over data, for instance, have the potential to lead to great 
inequalities.  Fourth, sharing incentivizes sharing, 
commodification leads to more commodification, and this leads 
to long term alienation and harm.193  There is harm in letting 
markets take advantage of individuals, even when what is being 
commodified is alienable if considered in isolation.  Fifth, behind 
the shiny façade of content-sharing platforms lies a covert 
market for the appropriation and exploitation of personal data, 
and from the above discussion we have a right to inalienable 
protections against abuses on the latter front. 
These arguments against commodification and against 
expansive understandings of alienable interests in data privacy 
lead us to our discussion of platform power in Part V of this 
Article. 
 
V. Consent as Disempowerment and Moving Beyond 
 
It has been argued throughout this Article that consent 
cannot have morally transformative force unless three things 
are true: (a) consent must be largely free and autonomous and it 
must be given under just background conditions; (b) consent 
must be capable of transforming the rights, obligations, or states 
of affairs that it is being relied on to transform; and (c) consent 
must not have harmful effects on third parties.  Parts III and IV 
have demonstrated that (b) and (c) cannot be true in the platform 
economy, because most, if not all, of the things consent is used 
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to legitimate or transform are not transformable through acts of 
individualized consent.  These things are either inalienable and 
constitutive of what it means to be a person with dignity, or their 
individualized and siloed transformation can have significant 
negative effects on third parties.  This section extends the 
argument by showing that questions regarding inalienability (b) 
and the collectivity (c) are intimately related to the question of 
what it means for consent to be free, autonomous, and given 
under just background conditions (a).  Specifically, to 
understand why notice and consent practices cannot have 
morally transformative force in the platform economy, we need 
to understand the power dimensions that underlie these 
practices. 
This section offers further context on the debate on consent 
by framing it normatively as a question of justice, articulating 
why a capacious understanding of justice requires the inclusion 
of power considerations.  It then shows why our reasons for 
valuing consent are weak, why arguments about paternalism 
miss the mark, and ends with an evaluation of platform 
governance options. 
 
A. Beyond the Mirage of Transformation: 
 
1. The Conditions for Voluntary Consent are Absent 
 
Adding to the performative mirage of relying on consent to 
morally justify the curtailment of certain inalienable interests 
and relationships, we must ask whether autonomous self-
directed and voluntary consent of the kind described in Part I of 
this Article is an actual possibility in the digital ecosystem.  Two 
sets of arguments are generally advanced to show that voluntary 
consent may itself be a mirage. 
There are unbridgeable psychological barriers to full, 
informed, unambiguous and voluntary consent. 
These barriers are as diverse as they are numerous.  
Structural complexity affects individuals’ ability to make good 
decisions regarding their personal data.194  Daniel Solove shows 
that individuals share data with hundreds of websites without 
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realizing it.195  Both data aggregation and the cumulative nature 
of harms in this space adds to the complexity of making sound 
choices; technology platforms process data continuously, they 
aggregate and disaggregate the data, add new data to pre-
existing datasets, train models on old datasets and then let them 
run on new data, etc.  The results are unpredictable, such that 
adding a small innocuous piece of information can have 
deleterious and unforeseen effects on vulnerable people.196  
Moreover, as said, there is evidence that people do not read the 
terms and conditions, and if they read them, often they do not 
understand them.197  Further, people are biased in their privacy 
choices and easily affected by small changes in the choice and 
consent architecture.198  We are inconsistent in that we say we 
care about privacy but then sign-up for a Twitter profile and post 
information publicly.199  Susan Athey, Christian Catalini, and 
Catherine Tucker found that people with a concern about 
privacy have no second thoughts providing their friends’ emails 
in exchange for pizza, and also that providing individuals with 
irrelevant but reassuring information about privacy protection 
in fact nudges them toward less privacy-friendly choices.200  Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s work on nudges also provides 
interesting insights: for instance privacy defaults matter and 
users will hardly change them.201  Familiarity with privacy 
risks202 and the context of choice-making also affect the outcome 
of our decisions about privacy.203  We also tend to be heavily 
influenced by other people’s privacy choices,204 and stick to bad 
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privacy choices made in the past.205 A small increase in the costs 
of one alternative can lead people to switch their attitude to 
privacy quite radically.206 
There are legal and strategic barriers to full, informed, 
unambiguous and voluntary consent. 
In addition to the psychological barriers to informed 
consent, legal, and strategic constraints make full transparency 
or meaningful disclosure are impossible.  There is tension 
between fair disclosure on the one hand, and marketing 
techniques as well as trade secrets practices on the other.207  
Companies use legal terms and conditions with their users as 
shields to protect themselves from liability and as swords to 
continue to carry out objectionable practices.  Companies whose 
business models rely heavily on data collection and analytics 
have an incentive to use vague, unspecific, and non-threatening 
language in their terms of service.  This is unsurprising in light 
of the losses they would suffer if their users decided not to opt 
into these services because of their contractual terms.  Further, 
sophisticated processing techniques such as machine learning 
algorithms and the use of neural networks often evade 
explainability208 and companies assert overbroad trade secrecy 
claims over these activities. 
 
2. Consent is about Power 
 
While these barriers are important, it is reductive to see 
them as exhaustive justifications for resisting consent.  As 
discussed in Part I of this Article, we must ensure not only that 
the subjective conditions for informed consent are fulfilled, but 
also that the background conditions within which consent 
operates are just.  For example, Bill might have consented to 
giving his snack to John, but if John grabs the snack in the 
context of an ongoing abusive relationship, or if it normalizes 
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abuse, then his act remains unjustified and consent has no 
transformative value.  Focusing on skillfully drawn lists of 
conditions for voluntary consent and disclosure, suggests that by 
considering voluntariness and ensuring that disclosure is 
accurate, we can pass judgment on the appropriateness of notice 
and consent in the digital context. 
This approach is reductive.  Confining our reasons in this 
way fails to take into account the power dynamics that underlie 
the practice of consent.  The problem is not only that individuals 
have no valid alternatives, or are unable to choose, or lack 
voluntariness or understanding, but that consent is being 
weaponized by powerful industry actors to forward their agenda.  
They do this by exaggerating the liberating force of consent for 
individuals, by idealizing its morally transformative value, and 
always resisting governmental interferences and downplaying 
alternative regulatory protections that would be largely more 
effective for users.  It is only by situating the practice within this 
corporate strategy devised to avoid governments and exploit 
individuals that the actual value of consent can be uncovered.  
The approaches of the FTC and EU data protection authorities 
leave us perplexed because they are based on precisely this 
narrow checklist approach: focused on voluntariness and 
idealized consent.  In doing so, these authorities gloss over 
deeper justice concerns and fail to account for the detrimental 
effects on those left behind. 
 
B. Platform Power 
 
Corporate manipulation of users cannot be addressed 
through a checklist or by focusing on implausible forms of 
voluntariness, disclosure, and informed consent. Our insatiable 
desire for platform harms and our gluttonous appetite for 
manipulation seem to call for an explanation that moves past 
traditional checklist understandings of autonomy and coercion.  
Underlying the psychological, factual, strategic, and legal 
impossibilities described above is the question of how power is 
exercised in digital ecosystems.  Therefore, instead of playing 
with the conditions for disclosure and informed consent, 
regulators should start focusing on how data is collected, 
handled, and stored.  Additionally, they should focus on how it 
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is being systematically analyzed through machine learning and 
other proprietary algorithmic systems to make inferences about 
individuals, pre-empt their tastes, and influence their decisions 
in view of making a profit. 
What is power in this context?  There are three views of 
platforms’ power.  The traditional view is illustrated by the 
understanding of market power in traditional antitrust law.  
Antitrust law defines market power as “the ability of one or more 
firms to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or 
quality of goods and services, diminish innovation, or otherwise 
influence parameters of competition”209 or the ability “to raise 
price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm 
customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or 
incentives.”210  The traditional view is relational and is premised 
on direct causation: there must be an entity exercising power 
and it must exercise its power by using force, coercing or 
otherwise directly imposing harm on others.  The harms must 
be tangible and observable, and include price increases or 
narrowly understood observable quality erosions.  These 
parameters have largely missed the intangible erosion of 
fundamental rights standards in the platform economy.211 
Recent events, such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
have led to a broadening of regulators’ interest in platform 
power.  A new conception of platform power seems to have 
emerged as a result.  An example is the German 
Bundeskartellamt’s decision against Facebook.212  The 
authority’s belief that antitrust and privacy laws can work in 
tandem to hold powerful companies with vast pools of data in 
check is grounded in an idea of power as ownership and control 
over vast amounts of personal data.  The ability of a company to 
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control vast amounts of data is indeed being increasingly 
perceived as harmful for both users and competitors who are 
unable to compete on the market for that data.  The 
Bundeskartellamt’s understanding defeats the traditional logic 
of market power, and places the power asymmetry between 
users and platforms at the forefront of regulators’ attention.  
Such view, however, is still premised on the need to re-establish 
users and competitors’ control over data, and on the paramount 
value of control and user choice. 
The third more radical view does not see platform power as 
a tangible force that is exercised linearly by one party over 
another to deprive the latter of control or choice over how data 
is being collected or used.  It is a broader vision of power as a 
systemic force structurally embedded in the platform economy.  
This cannot be fixed through small regulatory tweaks or better 
disclosure, but requires a radical revision of the way platforms 
operate and sustain themselves economically. 
This vision has been developed by Shoshana Zuboff through 
her work on “surveillance capitalism” as an evil that has grown 
systemically through banal business routine.  She defines 
“surveillance capitalism’s” effects as ones that “cannot be 
reduced to or explained by technology or the bad intentions of bad 
people, [but that] are the consistent and predictable consequences 
of an internally consistent and successful logic of 
accumulation.”213  Julie Cohen is also critical of systemic 
domination.214  Cohen envisions platforms as “infrastructure-
based strategies for introducing friction into networks”215 which 
operate “with the goal of making clusters of transactions and 
relationships stickier—sticky enough to adhere to the platform 
despite participants’ theoretical ability to exit and look elsewhere 
for other intermediation options.”216  For her: “[t]he platform 
economy rewrites all parts of [the competition] story reshaping 
the conditions of entry, the scope for disruption, and the sources 
of manifestation of economic power. Platforms do not simply 
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enter markets, they replace (and rematerialize) them.”217 
This third view of platform power understands platforms as 
loci of domination and control which benefit from and leverage 
the centralizing effects of the networks they exist within, are 
coextensive with and participate in creating.  It goes beyond the 
Bundeskartellamt understanding of power, beyond a view 
according to which one party exerts power by selecting the 
options or choices available to another.  As Stephen Lukes 
compellingly articulates it, power is about shaping the very 
environment within which a chooser’s preferences are formed.218  
For Lukes, the core characteristic of a power relation is not an 
observable exercise of influence or an observable reduction in the 
number of options available but rather the existence of a 
systematic interference with what those being dominated need 
or have reason to want.  As he notes, numbing is the primary 
manifestation of grave forms of power: 
 
[I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise 
of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, 
from having grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a 
way that they accept their role in the existing 
order of things, either because they can see it as 
natural and unchangeable, or because they value 
it as divinely ordained and beneficial?219 
 
It seems relevant to an understanding of platform power, 
therefore, that the things we have reason to want to protect, 
such as privacy or access to information without manipulation 
or discrimination, are not being afforded to us through consent, 
and in fact that practices of notice and consent render protecting 
these things more difficult.  A Foucaultian understanding of 
power220 can be particularly useful in explaining this 
discrepancy; how the rhetoric of consent operates against our 
interests, its particular internal logic and rhetorical force 
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prevents enquiry into its disempowering effects.221  In other 
words, notice and consent normalizes platform power, operating 
as a discourse of control which subtly burdens users with 
intractable governance responsibilities without empowering 
them.  It acts as a free pass for corporate action. 
 
C. The Value of Notice and Consent within a Theory of 
Platform Justice 
 
Scanlon points out that it is generally “a good thing for a 
person to have what will happen depend upon how he or she 
responds when presented with the alternatives under the right 
conditions.”222  There are good reasons to be able to self-manage 
privacy: it gives one a sense of responsibility, security, control 
over aspects of the self.  Before concluding we must consider the 
value of notice and consent once again and determine whether a 
comprehensive perspective makes us prefer consent to other 
alternatives.223 
Thomas Scanlon’s account of what he calls the “Value of 
Choice” offers some guidance on this question.224  Choice can 
have predictive or instrumental value (e.g. choosing my own 
meal because I know what I will enjoy eating); representative or 
demonstrative value (e.g. it is important that I be the one 
choosing my present for my mother’s birthday, even if I often buy 
things she dislikes); or symbolic value where there is stigma 
attached to my not making certain decisions myself which might 
make me look incompetent, immature, etc.. (e.g. in some cultures 
it is important that I should be the one choosing my life partner 
and not my parents).  These three categories of reasons for 
valuing choice are not mutually exclusive.  By way of analogy, 
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Brasenose College, Oxford University: The Significance of Choice 177, 178 
(May 18, 23, and 28, 1986) (transcript available from the University of Utah, 
Tanner Humanities Center, Lecture Library). See also a revised account in 
SCANLON, supra note 186. 
223. SCANLON, supra note 186. 
224. Thomas M. Scanlon, The Significance of Choice: Tanner Lectures, 
Lecture 2, at 177-201 (1986). Also see a revised account in WHAT WE OWE TO 
EACH OTHER ch. 6 (1998). 
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there are instrumental and intrinsic reasons for valuing consent 
as a regulatory device in the platform economy and we cannot 
entirely separate intrinsic from instrumental reasons.  
Instrumental justifications focus on the benefits that consent 
can bring to individual consenters.225  The most common 
instrumental justification for consent is that the individual has 
the best information to judge whether new rights should be 
created.226  Non-instrumental or intrinsic justifications focus on 
consent as having value regardless of consequences.  These 
reasons are generally grounded in an understanding of consent 
as allowing individuals to create their own moral law, pursue 
projects, and choose their own paths to flourishing.  Let us 
examine possible reasons for maintaining the centrality of 
consent in the platform economy. 
The first argument is that notice and consent are said to 
promote innovation and simplicity; it is seamless, versatile and 
is said to efficiently promote smooth business transitions 
avoiding excessive regulatory interference while ensuring their 
legitimacy.227  Individuals are said to have the most knowledge 
on what they want and consent allows them to easily make 
choices.  This argument advances a narrow understanding of 
innovation and an idealized view on the ability of individuals to 
police their own interests.  As discussed, the amount of 
knowledge individuals possess in such situations is subject to 
debate and is far from complete.  Further, deregulation and self-
regulation happen to favor incumbents more than they favor 
new entrants or consumers.228  This has become clear in the 
context of antitrust enforcement where the Chicago school belief 
in deregulation and permissionless innovation229 is being 
reconsidered and top down antitrust enforcement in digital 
 
225. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690). 
226. RAZ, supra note 21, at 85. 
227. See, e.g., Erika J. Nash, Notice and Consent: A Healthy Balance 
Between Privacy and Innovation for Wearables, 33 BYU J. PUB. L. 197 (2018). 
228. Yochai Benkler, Don’t Let industry write the Rules for AI, 569 
NATURE 161 (2019).  
229. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 925 (1978); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT 
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matters is reacquiring popularity.230  The FTC’s new Facebook 
decision, discussed above, is another demonstration of the 
current regulatory trend.231  Further, the ideology of innovation 
is far from flawless.232 
The second argument is that notice and consent advances 
users’ data security.  Competition over security avoids the 
erosion of standards which might result from a state monopoly 
over technology.  It also limits governmental interferences into 
users’ lives by allowing private companies to handle data.  This 
argument ignores that consent incentivizes the creation and 
storage of data, and that the more data is generated, the higher 
the security risks.  Thus, insofar as notice and consent 
contributes to data generation, it increases instead of reducing 
risks for individuals.233  Further, we know that the data stored 
by the industry is not immune from governmental access.234 
The third argument is that notice and consent allow 
individuals to obtain access to desired services at no cost.  The 
reality here is that consent does not allow individuals to obtain 
such services at no cost.  Instead, consent subjects their access 
to a variety of covert, manipulative, and discriminatory 
treatments that do not serve their interests in the long run.  
Consent serves the interests of the platform owners and other 
data brokers and third-party data collectors but not the interests 
of users who are disempowered in the platform economy.  Thus, 
none of these three good reasons for relying on consent seem 
sufficient. 
 
230. See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710 
(2017); Maurice Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 
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231. USA v. Facebook, Inc. , No. 91-cv-2184, 2019 WL 3318596 (D.D.C., 
July 24, 2019). 
232. See, e.g., Langdon Winner, The Cult of Innovation: Its Colorful Myths 
and Rituals, BLOG (June 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/M8MN-8Y6L.  
233. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH (2015). 
234. Google reports in its Transparency Report that between January 1 
and June 30 2018 it received more than 25.5 thousand government requests 
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Requests to Remove Content, Google  
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Looking now at the alternatives, while consent might have 
unique intrinsic value in that it ensures that individuals are at 
least symbolically informed of how they will be treated by 
platforms, it seems that replacing notice and consent with most 
alternatives would come at very little cost for individuals.  For 
example, relying on representatives, cooperatives, or trustees 
could ensure access to desirable services on more acceptable 
terms thanks to the greater bargaining power of such 
representatives, trustees, or cooperatives vis-à-vis platforms.235  
Ensuring minimized collection and analytics, secure handling 
and storage of our data may be impossible for us to consent to 
directly due to trade secrecy, IP, and other proprietary 
arrangements.  However, secure handling and storage may be 
possible through an intermediary, even if they acted outside the 
scope of our consent.236  To the extent there is value in 
intermediation, it seems that the value of individualized consent 
is very limited. 
Another alternative is the establishment of industry-wide 
privacy-protective interoperable standards which would 
promote the privacy interests of users even if they would not 
provide them with granular opportunities to make contextual 
choices.  It also seems that granular and versatile opportunities 
to make choices can lead to more harm than good in an 
environment where our choices are highly sensitive to small 
design changes and nudging. 
Overall, it seems that intrinsic and instrumental reasons for 
valuing consent go hand-in-hand.  To the extent consent does not 
allow individuals to determine desirable outcomes for 
themselves, i.e. to the extent it has no instrumental value, it 
seems to also have no intrinsic value in the sense of affording to 
individuals respect or worth, other than perhaps mere symbolic 
or ideological value. 
 
 
 
 
235. See, e.g., Katrina Ligett & Kobbi Nissim, Ground Rules and Goals for 
Data Co-ops  (2019) (unpublished manuscript); RADICALXCHANGE, 
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D. Clearing Doubts about Paternalism 
 
Regarding consent’s intrinsic value, it has been argued that 
it remains important for individuals to be directly notified or 
informed of what a platform intends to do with their data.  
Daniel Susser for example argues that notice maintains its value 
in spite of the flaws of notice and consent.237  It might also be 
argued that it remains important that any intermediary, data 
cooperative, or trustee is directly entrusted by a data subject 
with a mandate to act on their behalf.  Even if notice and 
disclosure remain incomplete, the symbolic or representative 
value attached to the notification and disclosure process might 
remain intact.  The strength of this argument is that it might 
point us toward regulatory solutions that combine notice and 
consent with greater top down protections for individuals, but it 
does not suggest that the legal and regulatory status quo in the 
US or EU is satisfactory. 
It is no doubt important to recognize the value of having the 
choice, of freely associating with others and of leading a life of 
one’s own choosing.  In this sense, accepting that consent’s 
symbolic or representative value may give us reason to consider 
governance options that entail complementing the practice with 
additional safeguards is important.  On the other hand, arguing 
that any and all interferences with choice are illegitimate and 
must pejoratively be understood as paternalistic is the wrong 
way of valuing choice. 
To the extent a governance option is advanced on the ground 
that it avoids “paternalistic” interferences with individual 
choice, we should be inclined to resist such justifications. 
Scanlon offers a nuanced explanation of why this is: 
 
Legal restriction of people’s freedom, “for their 
own good” is likely to seem justified where (a) 
people who make a certain choice are likely to 
suffer very serious loss; (b) the instrumental value 
of choice as a way of warding off this loss is, given 
 
237. Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy 
Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL. 
(2019). 
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the circumstances under which that choice would 
be exercised, seriously undermined; (c) the 
demonstrative value that would be lost by being 
deprived of this choice is minimal; and (d) the 
tendency to “make the wrong choice” under the 
circumstances in question is widely shared, so 
that no particular group is being held inferior in 
the argument for legal regulation. The pejorative 
ring of “paternalism” and the particular bitterness 
attaching to it stem from cases in which either the 
seriousness of the loss in question or the 
foolishness of the choice leading to it is a matter 
of controversy.238 
 
Standard privacy terms of service are systematically 
skewed in favor of technology platforms that intentionally craft 
them to minimize disclosures and limit responsibility.  There is 
a large and shared tendency to make the wrong choice, sign up 
to phishy websites and share data with unknown third parties 
by clicking “I agree,” or simply accepting to browse the Internet 
and be tracked.  Individuals who make those choices risk 
suffering serious loss.  The instrumental value of consent as a 
way of limiting damage for individuals is limited at best.  We 
have also seen that the case for the intrinsic value of consent is 
weak, and that alternatives such as delegation of consent to 
cooperatives or trusts are acceptable if not preferable to notice 
and consent.239 
The purpose of this Article was not to advance alternatives 
to notice and consent, or explain how alternative decision-
makers might be better placed than individuals to make 
decisions on data governance.  The aim was simply to show that 
there are good reasons to depart from the centrality of 
individualized notice and consent in practice and in theory.  Any 
political or regulatory authority, or group of individuals, charged 
with regulating personal data and shaping the relationship 
between platforms and individuals is likely to make mistakes.  
Yet, recognizing that alternative decision-makers are likely to 
 
238. Scanlon, supra note 222, at 181. 
239. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First 
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make mistakes is different from saying that any decisions that 
are not individually made are for that reason “paternalistic.”  
Given the limitations of notice and consent as a practice, 
considering the role of these alternative decision-makers has 
become a priority.  For the time being, it suffices to say that 
democratically determined standards and redlines regarding the 
generation, collection, storage and use of data need our focus 
more than notice and consent schemes do. 
 
E. How to Regulate Platforms 
 
Moving from consent to a broader perspective on how to 
regulate online platforms, the first question is what is regulation 
and how do we address the gaps that notice and consent 
practices have created and are leaving behind?  A few points 
should be noted.  First, the regulative power of law is to be found 
not only in public or regulatory laws, but also within less visible 
regimes such as private property and contractual 
arrangements.240  Second, it is important to keep in mind that 
what we traditionally understand as laws are not the only force 
at play; technologies, or socio-technical artifacts, can constrain 
behavior even more than laws do.  Laws in turn can act as 
technologies, entrenching technical defaults and reinforcing 
ideological interpretations of environmental constraints and 
affordances.241  In 1998 Lawrence Lessig in his famous essay The 
Laws of Cyberspace dwelled on the idea,242 that on the Internet, 
code shapes human behavior as much as laws, social norms and 
economic forces.243  Regulators for Lessig have four “modalities” 
at their disposal— laws, norms, markets and code—and when it 
comes to the Internet, perhaps the most powerful modality is the 
use of code.  Thus, legal and technological frameworks together 
shape our understanding of what platforms are and of the 
contexts in which notice and consent frameworks operate.  Legal 
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frameworks have transformed notice and consent into an 
artifact that shapes digital expectations and generates 
resistance around cultural, legal, technological and commercial 
alternatives.244 
We are currently at a crossroads.  A number of competing 
regulatory, technological, social, and economic models are being 
put forward to address the question of how to govern data and 
how to hold platform monopolies in check.  In the United States, 
nationalization of technology platforms is unpopular,245 but 
breaking up big tech and antitrust is not,246 nor is regulating 
platforms as public utilities.247  Internationalizing regulatory 
standards is becoming a priority.248  Technological solutionism 
is on the rise with initiatives such as blockchain-based data 
monetization platforms or new modes of web interaction.249  
Economists are reinventing markets for data to markets for the 
provision of labor by individuals to platforms.250  Scholars have 
proposed a variety of solutions to the data and platform 
regulation puzzle.  To name a few, Jack Balkin suggested 
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treating platforms as information fiduciaries.251  Margot 
Kaminsky envisions a “binary governance” framework which 
combines a system of individual due process rights with private-
public partnerships which she calls “collaborative governance,” 
the GDPR being an instance of such model.252  Julie Cohen has 
emphasized the importance of spaces immune from the control 
of platforms, what she calls “semantic discontinuity” and 
“interstitial spaces for play,”253 and Shoshana Zuboff speaks of a 
“right to sanctuary.”254 
In the context of this laboratory, moving beyond notice and 
consent requires proceeding in at least three stages. 
First, it is important to consider at the outset the history 
and context of the harms that need tackling and the interests 
which need to be protected.  To do so, it is crucial to understand 
the history, anthropology and sociology of how we have come to 
where we are now, and why the notion of consent can appear 
normatively compelling and rhetorically powerful yet practically 
flawed in the context of consumer contracts and voluntary 
privacy policies.255  This Article described some of the harms in 
question as invasions of privacy, manipulation, discrimination, 
bias, lack of due process, political polarization and echo chamber 
effects.  We not only need a better understanding of these harms, 
but we also need richer analyses of how they connect to the 
broader, abstract, systemically-skewed platform ecosystem and 
the power dynamics that underlie it.  Save in exceptional 
circumstances, we must be skeptical about “solutions” that 
present themselves as “fixes,” yet denote utter disregard for the 
historical, sociological, psychological and ideological dimensions 
of power which has led to the problem itself.  These “solutions” 
frequently do little more than recreate the same problems they 
were designed to address. 
Second, we must remain critical toward answers to the 
platform governance problem that tend to put most or all the 
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responsibility for protection from harm on individuals, and/or 
confer broad discretion, immunity and moral cover on deep 
pocketed and technically savvy companies for the sake of 
protecting innovation.  These suggestions are particularly 
problematic when they rely on the disclosure of complex 
information and connect broad responsibilities and 
consequences to implausible disclosures.  Notice and consent is 
one such problematic solution.  Other problematic solutions 
which must be resisted include: individualized data auctions, 
blockchain-based apps or other means to easily transfer data 
and monetize it which abstract individual choice from larger 
social dynamics. 
Third and finally, when asking how to address data 
governance and the relationship between users and platforms, 
we must prefer comprehensive regulation that tackles structural 
harm.  For instance, focusing on the notion of “data 
minimization” under the GDPR to narrow “fixes” that address 
legal questions in isolation. 
The following is a list of strategies or developments that are 
welcome and in some cases should be further developed: 
 
  The GDPR is an example of sectoral regulation which, 
although it focuses in our view too heavily on informed 
consent and privacy self-management, in fact contains a 
number of important shifts toward privacy protective 
defaults, and innovative provisions.  Such privacy 
protection measures include: data protection by design,256 
data protection impact assessments,257 and data 
minimization principles,258 all of which require 
coordination between data controllers and privacy 
regulators, thus departing from individual control. 
  The recent FTC Facebook investigation and five billion 
dollar fine, in spite of criticisms that the FTC did not go 
far enough, is a signal for the industry that privacy and 
behavioral advertising are no joking matter.  It also 
provided an opportunity for FTC commissioners to 
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88https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7
2019 CONSENT AS A FREE PASS 395 
 
demand greater enforcement powers, and to signal the 
need for federal privacy legislation.259  In parallel, there 
are signs that antitrust enforcement against technology 
companies is on the rise in the United States.260 
 
  The Bundeskartellamt decision against Facebook,261 in 
spite of its focus on informed consent, is also a welcome 
attempt at regulating technology platforms by reaching 
beyond disciplinary silos, and opting for a cross-sectoral 
and cross-disciplinary methodology that puts forward a 
new understanding of platform power.  Further calls 
have been made recently for a unified approach to 
platform governance or the regulation of social media 
through a one-stop-shop.  Each of these initiatives 
deserves individualized scrutiny. 
  There have been calls for data fiduciaries, data trusts or 
intermediaries of various kinds that would act as buffers 
between users and platforms.  While not all of these 
proposals are equally sound, recent work around data 
cooperatives seems to be heading in a promising 
direction.262 
  Finally, if notice and consent is here to stay, which is a 
possibility, it is crucial that it be complemented with 
stringent standards of privacy compliance on the part of 
technology actors and that it does not remain a 
standalone means of governing privacy.  The California 
Consumer Privacy Act is a very timid move toward 
greater empowerment of users vis-à-vis companies, 
which entrenches notice and consent and does not appear 
to go far enough.  A number of Federal Proposals are also 
similarly removing the voluntary element in notice and 
choice practices in the United States.  The American Law 
Institute’s Restatement on Consumer Contracts have 
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attempted to establish protections for consumers who 
opt-in to browserwrap contracts because of behavioral 
biases and information asymmetries in this space.263  
More protections will be needed in future for addressing 
the power gaps between users and platforms, but 
arguably none of these protections can tackle the serious 
underlying problems explored in this Article. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Loose reliance on the binary presence or absence of 
voluntary consent and disclosure has allowed online platforms 
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter to engage unhindered 
in opaque and intrusive targeted advertising practices, profiling, 
and other profit-making activities that have not clearly 
benefited consumers and that actually covertly harm them. 
Consent enables the moral transformation of the 
relationship between persons in a variety of circumstances, but 
access to information platforms does not seem one of them.  As 
said, justifying the morally transformative force of consent in 
any context requires at least three elements.  First, consent 
cannot be used to transform rights and interests that are 
inalienable.  Second, consent must not have far-reaching effects 
on third parties.  Third, consent must not only be voluntary and 
a self-directed act of the will, but it must also be given under just 
background conditions, meaning that we need to consider the 
underlying power dynamics that affect whether a person’s 
reasons for consenting are justifiable. 
In the platform economy, all three elements are missing.  
Regulators and legal authorities focus on the voluntariness of 
consent and the adequacy of companies’ disclosure idealizes the 
practice in circumstances where it cannot have morally 
transformative effects.  Notice and consent frameworks place the 
burden of data governance on individuals who are not in a 
position to make individualized decisions about how data is 
treated.  They not only impose harms on people who never 
consented to the practices themselves, but also subordinate our 
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core inalienable right to be protected against manipulative, 
discriminatory and harmful digital practices, and to the 
economic interests of the platforms.  The idealization of such 
practice has also had the effect of reducing the interest and 
appetite of administrative agencies, legislators, civil society and 
consumers for more adequate alternatives. 
There are, therefore, many reasons to object to the 
centrality of notice and consent mechanisms in the United 
States and Europe.  The time is now ripe to look beyond existing 
paradigms of individual control and to grapple with the core 
structure of corporate surveillance markets and incentives. 
Emerging legislative proposals at the federal level in the United 
States are hints that the winds might be changing, but more 
needs to be done not only legally but also ideologically, socially, 
and economically.  A number of technological, political, and legal 
avenues for enacting change and ensuring better protection for 
consumers exist and deserve further attention.  The longer we 
fail to acknowledge consent’s irrelevance to data governance in 
the platform economy, the longer we will deny ourselves respect 
and protection from the ever-growing expansion of digital 
markets into our lives. 
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